General Meyer,
I have read most of Gordon's recollections and obviously a person with his fighting record deserves our attention. As a venerable leader of unquestioned loyalty and remarkable perseverance most of us would think twice about questioning his opinion on battles he personally fought in. He is not sparing in his criticism of others including Early whom he served under the longest. But, he respected Early greatly and if he did question his decision it was not personal, but based on his on first hand knowledge of the situation. I noticed Early's stated reason for not renewing the attack was very much the usual response from a general of the era: "The starving troops were tired and disorganized after plundering the enemies camps. We needed to gather all of the badly needed supplies from the battlefield as a first priority. I did not feel my forces were in any condition to make another attack and it was best to hold on to what we had gained." This seemed like a canned answer from a man surprised by the success of his attack and absent of a plan on what to do next (yes, my opinion only).
I have searched my on recollections of my unending desire to understand the whys and hows of civil war battle results. I believe one constant factor present when Early made his decision affected many generals when faced with the most difficult decision on the battlefield. Am I willing to sacrifice my entire force for one more attack that "could" completely destroy my enemy. Many civil war historians called this the "killer instinct" characteristic that some generals possessed, but many did not. Grant, Sherman, Lee and especially Stonewall Jackson were all attributed to have the ability to move in for the kill on a wounded enemy. Jackson exhibited it in the valley and at Chancellorsville with great success. Lee exhibited it at Gettysburg, but had misread his opponent, having committed all to the attack. Grant clearly understood the concept at Shiloh, Vicksburg, and time and again during the Overland Campaign even if the results were not decisive.
I believe Early was an excellent commander, but was simply unable even with the possibility of changing the outcome of the war to roll the dice with all the chips on the table. Those types of generals are rare and the ones who do it only when the time is ripe are even rarer. Napoleon, Alexander, Caesar, Genghis Khan and Rommel all belong a small exclusive group of commanders who never shied from committing every last man to the final attack and win or lose "everything". So I think Early was concerned about what history would say about a general who committed and lost everything. He never considered what could be gained if he won the elusive "total" victory that day.
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