I'm not sure that Jackson would have made as big of a difference to the ANV, as many observers seem to think. Ewell was plenty aggressive in his decision making on July 1st, from marching towards Gettysburg rather than Cashtown as Lee instructed, and not hesitating to pitch into the XI Corps despite Lee's orders not to bring about a general engagement. Ewell's aggressive decision making did much to secure the rebel victory on July 1st. Had things gone sideways for Ewell north of Gettysburg, one could certainly make an argument that his actions were insubordinate. Whatever the outcome, Lee was clearly intending to mass the army at Cashtown before advancing westward, and two of his top commanders arguably defied orders by moving on Gettysburg in such strength.
The big wild card would be to what degree Lee would exert operational direction and control over Jackson during the campaign. While Lee had a deferential style of command when it came to Longstreet and Jackson, he tried to exhibit more control over his formations throughout the Gettysburg campaign than he usually did and arguably never found the right balance with Hill and Ewell. Lee was interested in taking Harrisburg and consequently directed Ewell to move on that spot. Jackson or no Jackson, Lee was still operating blind without Stuart, and the news that the Army of the Potomac was already across its namesake river and moving into Pennsylvania came as a great shock to Lee, and upset pretty much every part of his operational design in progress. It is unclear how Jackson would impact this development, especially if he was given the lead like Ewell had been and was operating against Harrisburg like Ewell. He might have captured Harrisburg, maybe not. Either way he would have soon received orders to move south and join Lee.
This is where things get interesting. If Jackson had received orders to march on Cashtown, would he then have moved to that spot and ignored the growing sounds of battle near Gettysburg? Jackson was if anything a stickler for obeying orders, and if he had explicit orders to head to Cashtown it's possible that he would have disregarded Hill's predicament and joined Lee. Jackson was not very good at managing meeting engagements (Kernstown, Cedar Mountain, Brawner Farm) and I think he would have run into the same indecision that Ewell did has he faced down Cemetery Hill on the afternoon of July 1st. Ewell had received reports of Federal troops approaching down the York Rd, which would have put a federal column squarely in the rear left flank of any rebel attack. These reports were partially accurate - Sykes had been heading down that road earlier in the day, but unknown to the rebels had been diverted to the Baltimore Pike route. Secondly, Cemetery Hill was not nearly as undefended as some have claimed - there was a Yankee division in reserve on the hill, and the masses of the retreating I Corps and XI Corps were all gathering on the hill.
Ewell's corps had taken a beating on July 1st, and didn't have its full strength on the field. Given the nearness of Johnson's division and the casualties, it's entirely reasonable to think that Jackson would have at least paused a bit to allow Johnson to come up before moving on Cemetery hill. Early and Rhodes were both non-committal and lukewarm to the idea of continuing the attack, and Ewell certainly took this into account when he decided to pause for the night. With the lack of reliable information on the enemy strength and disposition, an exhausted an incomplete corps, and a potential threat to the rear of his position, it's very possible Jackson might have reached the same conclusion as Ewell.
_________________ Col. Jeff McMahon Third Division, VI Corps Army of the Shenandoah
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