American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

I think this was a topic here a while back, so my apologies if this is a repeat. I just finished listening to the auido version of Newt Gingrich's et al book, "Gettysburg". If you are not familiar with the book, it presents an alternate history, having Lee move south after the first day at Gettysburg, to fight a decisive battle along the Pipe Creek north of Westminister. In looking over the scenario lists for Campaign Gettsyburg, I see a few scenarios consistent with this theme as well.

I found the book (CDs) interesting. I thought the strategic idea of the move south by Lee plausible. However, Gingrich, et al set up the engagement at Pipe Creek, as Gettysburg in reverse with the union doing its version of Pickett's Charge with even more horrific results. At one point Meade is referencing "his Corps success at Fredricksburg" as the blueprint for a AoP victory in assualting a prepared Rebel position this time. That didn't pass my crediblity test. The rebel commanders all seemed to get an increase in their leadership/command ratings for this battle, again given the ANV had withdrawn from the field at Gettysburg, I don't think the top leaders could do a good enough PR job on a march south to explain how this was really a "maneveur of success". But I do think the story is worth hearing/reading.

However, I do think a meeting engagement of the two armies following Day 1 at Gettsyburg would make for an interesting "mini campaign". Need to have some options that don't allow the Rebs to have a completely prepared position for the big battle. If anyone has some suggestions about which scenarios might make an interesting sequence of games, I would like to hear about them.

I got the CDs from my local library. It's a 15 disc set about 17 hours total. If you have the time, it's an interesting story. I also believe there is a second book in the series - Grant Moves East. Given the ending of the first book, I suspect Chamberlain will still have his opportunity for fame in that one.

Lt Gen Bob Breen
Commanding 4th Bde, 2nd Div, VI Corps, AoS
"Where we lead, the Army follows" - VI Corps

I had a post on that topic a while back. There is a second book and it is a good read also. I'm awaiting the third as it should be the climax of an interesting trilogy.

General Mark Nelms
Union Chief of the Army

Personally, I hated the book. I thought it was so completely unrealistic as to be insulting. Just my opinion, but it seemed to ignore many realities of supply, movement capabilities and the character of some of the generals seemed to be almost completely opposite, at least based on my impressions of them from extensive reading. If you really wanted the South to win at Gettysburg I guess you would love the book, otherwise I thought it was weak.

Major General Don Golen
Army of the Potomac, USA!

Have read the first two books, friend of mine loaned them to me otherwise I probably wouldn't have. Have to agree with Don about them. First Stuart shows up at Gettysburg on the first day. Then Lee moves his whole army around Meade without him discovering it when he's sitting on the Roundtops. Meade was worried about Lee moving around him, sent cavalry to watch both his flanks, yet they have him sit on his hands while it happens. Then Meade attacks Lee in the position he considered the best defensive position in the area. Sorry it just doesn't wash, Lee himself had a high opinion of Meade, Lee said he'd make no blunder in front of him and take advantage of any Lee made. This is nothing more than wishful thinking.

Lt.Gen.Ken Miller
Veteran's Divsion
VIII / AoS

I look at this from two perspectives -- history and gaming.

As for history, I don't think I've ever heard a good description of why Lee pressed the assualt at Gettysburg after Day 1. Based on what he knew and didn't know it has been one of those questions I wish he had answered directly - I don't think he ever did. So the alternate history approach is interesting, although obviously fictional and argueably with problems of its own. But if one is trying to sell three books, the south would have to win the first one. Don't know what happens in book 2, but I'll bet the Union succeeds in book 3.

As for gaming, while playing a historical game of Gettsyburg is still an interesting battle, it does tend to get a bit old. As I said in the original post I think an alternative along the idea of Lee moving south after day 1, is a more interesting choice for a mini-campaign design. In a discussion in one of the Colonial Club forums the idea was proposed to use the HPS Campaign Engine to apply to a battle. Gettysburg might be a good candidate for something like this, in that you could even divide each day's battle into a series of segments, that requried a "strategic" choice to be made. The results of such choices would not only decide where the next battle might be fought, but perhaps things like the degree of fatigue or amount of fortifications each side might have. So maybe the rebs do get Stuart's Cav early, but at some reduced strength an increased fatigue. Or maybe the Union Corps arrive even faster at Gettysburg also with some loss of strength and increase in fatigue. I think such a "mini campaign version of the battle" which I think can be done with the existing HPS game, could be an interesting game.

Lt Gen Bob Breen
Commanding 4th Bde, 2nd Div, VI Corps, AoS
"Where we lead, the Army follows" - VI Corps

If you want a rather different view of why Lee did what he did I recommend reading "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" by Troy D. Harman.

It has been a while since I read it but I will try to summarize it. Harman's premise is that Lee recognized Cemetery Hill as the key to the battlefield and his attacks on all three days were aimed at the same result, to take that position. He also goes on to show that Lee original orders for each attempt were intended to take the hill by flank not by head on assault. His final orders for each attack were a result modifications to that plan forced on him by circumstances. In other words, he couldn't do what he wanted too so he improvised and did what he could.

Needless to say, Longstreet comes out as the major cause of his intended plan degenerating into improvised plans. Most of the rather short book is showing what Lee had intended to do and the evidence of that followed by an outline of how his plan came undone and ended up little more than a frontal assault each day.

A more likely what if for Gettysburg is that Longstreet stopped sitting in a mud puddle whining about not letting him do his plan and executing Lee's plan with energy. Lee ordered Longstreet to attack in the morning. The order was given at dusk on day one when Longstreet's divisions were just six miles from Gettysburg. Lee got up at 4 am on the second expecting to see Longstreet with two divisions ready to attack Cemetery Hill from Pitzer's woods area. This would be an interesting second day scenario but I wouldn't want to be the Yankee player[:D].

Col. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
III Corps, AoM (CSA)

Might as well throw in my two cents...

I have read both books and enjoyed them for the entertainment they are - they are alternative histories, pure fiction based on <i>possible</i> courses of events. To answer some of the questions:

1) Could Lee have moved south as depicted in book one ("Gettysburg")? Very doubtful. The ANV Supply train was still west of Gettysburg, as was Pickett's division, and neither would have been able to get to a road to cut south on the east side of the mountains in time for the ANV to move south as a unified body by the afternoon of Day 2 - as it was Pickett didn't arrive until late evening on July 2 and the wagons would have been behind them... so moving south on July 2 while Stuart demonstrated north and east of the Union line? The demonstration would likely have been possible as depicted, but getting the rest of the ANV south on July 2 would have taken a feat of logistical coordination that not even UPS or FedEx could have pulled off.

2) I had no problem with Meade attacking the Pipe Creek line - it is backed up in the book by pressure from Washington, and from my view of Meade, he was not the type to openly go against his superiors, even to the point of executing pointless orders out of spite (such as in the Overland Campaign of 64 while Grant was looking over his shoulder). That Meade would also sit around Gettysburg and continue to concentrate while Lee moved southwest I have no problem with because, as I have mentioned, he was not very agressive/offensively minded. I think if Longstreet and Meade had commanded armies against each other, the two sides very well would have sat on opposite sides of the same valley and starved to death before either attacked.

3) Why did Lee stay and fight? He said himself, the enemy was there and he must fight them there. The ANV at this point was stretched for supplies and only had ammo available for one large battle. He had little intelligence thanks to Stuart and strategically there were few options left other than to attack. He couldn't move northeast because then the Union army would be in his rear and have easy access to his already tenuously long line of supply and communication - lacking most of his cavalry corps, he couldn't leave it vulnerable. As I mentioned above, this is also why he couldn't easy move South/southwest on July 2 - no way to get the wagons and artillery reserve safely past the front of the Union army - an aggressive push west as Sickle's requested and attempted in the book could have destroyed the ANV easily if conducted on a large enough scale. Lee had gambled with such moved in the past (especially Chancellorsville, with a smaller army) but the road network on the Confederate side of the field was not condusive to rapid north-south movement. It was either go back across the mountains and move south (tantamount to admitting defeat) or try to force the Union off of Cemetery Hill and regain the initiative.

Notice I say push them off of Cemetery Hill, not the Round Tops. I've just read Troy Harman's "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" and highly recommend it. It isn't fancy, and I wouldn't put it up with the likes of Gordon Rhea or Peter Cozzens for writing ability of the author, but he makes a very strong case that our perceived ideas about the Round Tops being the key to the battle are completely false, especially through the eyes of Lee at the time. Reading that book could drastically change your views on the battle of Gettysburg and give a new understanding of Lee's actions. It isn't long and is an easy read.

I suppose I should stop preaching now?



Regards,
Captain Alan Lynn
3rd Battery "Jacksonville Greys"
4th Div, II Corps, AoA
God bless <><

I have not read the books yet, but intend to.

Still, I agree completely with the notion that there is no way that Lee would, or could have moved south around the union left flank at Gettysburg. It would have constituted tactical insanity of the highest order, and I continue to be amazed at all those who continue to promote the notion.

Meade could have easily matched any move Lee made in that direction and Lee would have found himself contunually ever more mired in an increasingly inextricable strategic situation.

Lee stood and fought at Gettysburg because there is little else he could have done other than to have declared the first day the victory he was after and than turned around and headed back home. Any grand tactical flanking movements he might have made would have left his force vulnerable to being cutoff from its supply lines and lines of communication. And Pennsylvania was anything but the hollow shell that Sherman so bravely marched into in Georgia.

For those interested, I received a post from the Brett Schulte's ACW
Recommended Reading group that the final book in the series would be
out @ 21 June.

My take on the series was that the authors had some very different
perceptions on the competence of some of the leaders involved than I
did, and reached some odd conclusions, but everyone is entitled to
their fantasies.

One of these has Joe Johnston attacking Sherman at Vicksburg. Another
has Grierson bringing superior western cavalry east to stun Stuart's
cavalry. Students of history will note that Grierson's Cavalry was whipped at Brice's Crossroads by an inferior force under Forrest, who then whipped his infantry supports as well. It's hard to evaluate forces fighting in different theaters against different opponents, but imho the eastern Union cavalry at Gettysburg was probably the equal of its western counterparts, and probably enjoyed an advantage in weapons, since the eastern theater usually took priority.
Anyway, the series makes light enjoyable reading, but plausible it
ain't. For those interested in a good history of the Union cavalry,
I recommend Stephen Z Starr's 3-volume work.

MG Mike Mihalik
1/III/AoMiss/CSA