American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

No Offense to Porter Alexander a fine artilleriest, he was outclassed by Hunt that day.

Oh and I read somewhere one time that there was timing fuse issue with CSA shells that were supplied to the ANV and it was found and tested sadly a few days after Gettysburg.

Let me try to dig up the article.

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<b>Major General Scott "The Mad Prussian" Ludwig</b>
Commanding Officer, Western Theater, CSA
Interim Chief of Staff, CSA
"The Army Commissary" and "The Traveling Blowhard of Virginia"
Retried ANV Commander 2004-06

http://www.networkforgood.org

[url="http://napoleonicwargaming.com"]Napoleonic Wargaming - 1NWCG[/url]</center>

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Scott Ludwig</i>
<br />No Offense to Porter Alexander a fine artilleriest, he was outclassed by Hunt that day.

Oh and I read somewhere one time that there was timing fuse issue with CSA shells that were supplied to the ANV and it was found and tested sadly a few days after Gettysburg.

Let me try to dig up the article.

<b>Major General Scott "The Mad Prussian" Ludwig</b>
Commanding Officer, Western Theater, CSA
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Indeed, most Confederate artillery ammunition was inferior, especially the percussion ignited and time fused varieties. Many of the shells that overshot Cemtetery ridge and wound up in the Union rear areas simply came down and never exploded.

Even so, the Union batteries in position in the center of Cemetery Ridge were decimated by the Confederate bombardment, losing many men, guns, and horses. Nearly all of them had to be replaced from the artillery reserve, which was the Union plan from the start. Their supply situation was not much better than the Confederates - they were low on ammunition as well, and thus decided that since they were fighting defensively that they would withold from engaging in long rage, wasteful artillery duels and hold their ammo for the Confederate infantry instead. Hancock didn't support this idea and ordered all guns along the II Corps front to return counterbattery fire anyway. But the majority of the guns on Cemetery Hill and the 20 lb Parrots on Little Round Top mostly held their fire until after the Confederate barrage had ceased and the infantry was on its way over.

I hardly think it is fair to say that Hunt outclassed Alexander on that day. Class, forethough, planning, skill - none of that came into play. Alexander had orders to carry out and he did so. Hunt and Meade anticipated a renewed Confederate attack and planned to meet it with concentrated fire instead of wasting their ammo vs. enemy artillery before hand.

It was never a question of Hunt vs. Alexander.

Regards,

Brig. Gen. Alan Lynn
2nd Div, II Corps, AoA
VMI Training Staff

God Bless <><

Two things.

First, Lee was willing to take a gamble on winning the war at that point, and expected too much of his men.

Second, everyone seems to forget that Stuart with his (now rested) cavalry was supposed to get behind the union, but was prevented.

If the union center broke, even temporarily, and word spread of Stuart in the rear, we would now be talking about the great confederate victory at Gettysburg.

Col. Beno
Inactive Reserve

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Col. B</i>
<br />Two things.

First, Lee was willing to take a gamble on winning the war at that point, and expected too much of his men.

Second, everyone seems to forget that Stuart with his (now rested) cavalry was supposed to get behind the union, but was prevented.

If the union center broke, even temporarily, and word spread of Stuart in the rear, we would now be talking about the great confederate victory at Gettysburg.

Col. Beno
Inactive Reserve
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A few thousand exhausted Confederate cavalrymen on even more exhausted horses that could probably barely trot much less gallop by July 3rd weren't ever going to do much good, even if the Union cavalry - which was comparatively fresh and better supplied and better armed - wouldn't have been there to stop them... [B)]

Regards,

Brig. Gen. Alan Lynn
2nd Div, II Corps, AoA
VMI Training Staff

God Bless <><

Afraid I got to jump in again since recent historians have tended to make Longstreet look like he and only he new war had changed.[:D]

First, Pickett's charge was a mistake on Lee's part. But you have to put this in context with the time. Lee had succeeded before by putting all his force in and he tried one more time and it failed. Unlike us "200 Foot Generals" he didn't know the AoP was concentrated right behind the hill and in the past defeats like the first and second day would have been sufficient to break the nerve of the AoP command. This is what changed on him in July of 63, the AoP failed to admit defeat and leave like they had done in 62 and early 63.

As for the charge, Lee gave orders to Longstreet to make a "sunrise attack" (not afternoon). According to Harman's book, Lee's orders were to "Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2nd, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewelll was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time."

From that moment on Longstreet seems to done everything possible to make the plan fail. This included putting a Colonel in charge of the artillery who wouldn't have the authority to fully coordinate the fire, delaying Pickett by ording him to camp four miles from the battlefield when he new he was to lead a "sunrise attack", and leaving it to Pickett to lead the attack. While nothing probably could have saved the attack, Longstreet's actions deserve censor.

As to Longstreet at Seven Pines. Johnson wasn't with Longstreet, he was at the battle. Longstreet was off disobeying orders. Johnson had ordered Longstreet to take his, Whiting's and Magruder's divisions and attack the Union right down Nine Mile road. Instead Longstreet decide to march to the right down Williamsburg Road. Whiting's division was the only division that finally made the correct attack on the Union right. Longstreet never showed up but did manage to block Huger's division that was suppose to be attacking the Union left. To quote Sears "Of the 29,500 men in the three divisions under his command that day, Longstreet managed to get just 12,500 into the Seven Pines battle". The net result only Whiting and D. H. Hill actually were engaged in the battle. To quote again Sears, "The scene took on the look of comic opera."

As for Longstreet at 2nd Manassas. The only thing that saved him from pulling defeat from the jaws of victory was Jackson being able to hold off Pope for an extra day and Pope with help of McCellan being an idiot. His attack should have run into Porter's whole Corps instead of the flank of Pope's worn out army. This wasn't due to Longstreet's foresight though. Against anyone but Pope with McCellan refusing to reinforce his attack would have bee to late and ineffective.

I am more of the opinion that Longstreet was mostly better at blaming others for his short comings. If you could ever get him in place he could hold a position but wasn't much good for anything else.




<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by ALynn</i>
<br />I. Alexander was not even the highest ranking Confederate artillery officer at Gettysburg, and given that the bombardment on Day 3 involved guns from all 3 corps and the artillery reserve, the true commander was Nelson Pendelton. Longstreet deferred to Alexander only because of the connection with his own corps and close proximity to where Longstreet was sitting.

II. Only 1/3 of the attacking force came from Longstreet's corps, the remaining 2/3 from Hill, and therefore Hill should have truly been in command of the Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble charge.

III. Some idiot moved the Confederate artillery reserve ammunition train farther to the rear during the bombardment to escape overshot Union counterfire, and didn't bother to tell Alexander or Pendleton where they took it, and it wasn't discovered until after the charge had been repulsed.

IV. Longstreet knew better than to attack - Pickett's charge would have failed no matter what time Longstreet ordered it to begin. The blame lies with Lee, not Longstreet. As is often the case with powerful generals, Lee allowed his ego to overcome his intellect and ignored the basic principles of warfare (one of which is surely never attack over 1 mile of open ground with the enemy able to fire upon you from three sides...)

V. General Johnson was with Longstreet at Seven Pines, waiting with his flanking column, but none of them could hear the sound of battle due to one of those freak atmospheric phenomenon and thus they did not know the battle had started.

VI. If Longstreet had committed his Corps piecemeal at Second Manassas on Day 2 it is highly likely that Pope would have been able to hold off those weaker attacks and then perhaps overwhelm the heavily outnumbered Confederates. As it was, Longstreet attacked with his entire Corps, overlapped Pope's ignored flank, and drove the Yankees back in dissarray. Pope being an idiot helped, of course...

I'm not a Longstreet apologist, but I do think he gets a great deal more blame than he truly deserved in many cases based on his actions in the post war era and getting on the bad side of so many other Confederate generals after the war when the history was first written.

Regards,

Brig. Gen. Alan Lynn
2nd Div, II Corps, AoA
VMI Training Staff

God Bless <><
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BG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
III Corps, AoM (CSA)