American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign
by Scott Bowden and Bill Ward
Da Capo Press, 2003

My opinion: I am not much of a book reviewer but I consider this book a must read for anyone interested in the Civil War. So far it is the best book I have seen written on the enter workings of the higher command levels during the Civil War. Most military histories give you the impression that the generals make a decision then magically this is transformed into actions either successfully or unsuccessfully. This book attempts to follow these decisions and their resulting orders as they move down the chain of command and are turned into actions or lack of action. You may not agree with some of their conclusions but the book will give you a much better understanding of the problems of moving an army and fighting a battle.

The book is written from the perspective of the Confederate high command during the Gettysburg Campaign. Primarily from General Lee's decision making and how his orders were implemented by his Corps, Division and Brigade commanders. While it does cover some of the details of the fighting at the brigade and regiment level especially Longstreet's attack on the second day, it doesn't try to be a detail retelling of these fights. What it does try to address is what their objectives were and why they failed or achieved them as the case may be.

The first chapter discusses the strategic situation facing Lee and the Confederacy in May and June of 1863. The decisions that were made and how they contributed to the success or failure of the campaign. It also give a very good discussion of why Lee felt the only course of action that had a chance of working was the invasion of the north rather than reinforcing the West. It also discusses Davis's fixation on defending all Confederate territory and how it lead to the withholding of veteran ANV brigades that would have made a difference in the coming campaign.

The second chapter discusses Lee's Art of War and in particular they way Lee viewed the duty of the army commander versus his subordinates. It goes back threw Lee's history and how those experiences shaped his views. It also gives some interesting information on the staff organization of his army. While the ANV general staff was rather small it was larger than some authors give you the impression of.

The third chapter goes into considerable detail on the relation of Lee and Stuart and what Stuart's orders were. The authors go into considerable detail here as to what the orders were and what they meant. And we begin to see a theme that is developed throughout the book as to what is a "discretionary order" versus what they claim Lee issued which is an "order with discretion". This distinction is critical in interpreting what Lee wanted his generals to do later in the battle. I think the authors made a good case for Lee always ended his orders with an escape clause like "if practicable". These orders were orders not descretionary orders but they allowed the commander in the field to use their own judgment as well. This was necessary because only the field commander new the true situation and whether the order could be accomplished as given.

The fourth and fifth chapters cover the concentration at Gettysburg and the battle of the first day. It is here that we begin to see both the successes and failures of Lee's subordinates, particularly Ewell and Hill. And this is also where we see the authors take issue with other writers over what was ordered and if these orders were carried out. They particular focus on the poor tactical handling of the troops by Hill, Heth and Rodes. Then after the success of Ewell's attack the failure of Ewell, Hill and Pendleton to follow direct orders that would result in the occupation of Culp's and Cemetery Hills.

Chapters six and seven address the planning and execution of the attacks on the second day. Again we see the failure of command on the Confederate left. This time both Ewell and his division commanders fail to properly handle the placement and use of their men. Meanwhile on the right the authors give Longstreet high praise for coordinating one the best and most destructive attacks made during the war. I question their willingness to overlook how long it took Longstreet to get into position but do agree based on their description of how Longstreet handled the commitment of his troops that once things got going no commander could have done better. They go into considerable detail how various things both made the attack such a success and ultimately a failure. They also had some interesting observations on whether Little Round Top was important, how Hood's early wounding left his division leaderless at a critical time, and how the attack was undone by Posey's failure to control his brigade followed by Mahone's complete failure to advance which unhinged the echelon attack.

But the most interesting thing presented was the summary for the day and battles fighting. Most histories give you the impression that the attack on the second day was repulsed and succeeded in little other than killing a lot of soldiers. But the authors summary says that Longstreet's attack in spite of only having half the force it was suppose to and being out numbered two to one practically destroyed three Union Corps. To quote:

"At a cost of just some 6,500 men, Lee's army had inflicted almost twice the number of casualties on Meade's forces during the fighting on July 2. Although Lee's goal was not achieved, that statistic was, and remains, an impressive one - especially when one considers that the Confederates advanced over largely open ground against an enemy armed with superior artillery and fighting on the defensive. Total Confederate and Federals losses for both days were about 12,000 and 20,000, respectively. Expressed as a percentage, Lee's army had thus far inflicted 60% more casualties on the Federals that it had suffered."

But this very success will lead Lee to make the mistake of trying to repeat the attack but done right, he hoped, on the third day. The authors in chapter 8 make a good case for why Lee felt he could win with one more attack. The previous two days of fighting had crippled five of the seven Union Corps. The I and III Corps were almost wiped out. Lee had two of his nine division that had hardly engaged to build an attack around. His chances would never be better so he tried and saw his plans fall apart far worse than they had on the first and second days. And here the authors place most of their blame on Longstreet who failed to coordinate any part of the attack as well as Pendleton for withdrawing the artillery support.

I think their discussion of the third day is a bit weak since they can't easily make a case for the attack being a success if everything had happened according to play but there were plenty of errors made to help doom the attack.

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General Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
AoT II/1/3 (CSA)