American Civil War Game Club (ACWGC)

Gentlemen,

I'm currently playing a campaign where, despite anihilating a unit twice, it keeps reappearing. Approximately 13% of my losses reappear between scenarios. What gives?

When a unit is completely destroyed should the stragglers and walking wounded reform around a brand new set of colors (twice!) or should they be merged with another unit? The benefit of having these small zombie units is both their lack of VPs and the overall effect of the them is setting up a forward observer post for my all knowing general. These guys are GREAT for scouting - the best part is that even if they're all killed this scenario, they'll be back for the next one!

My question is: should this happen? When there's no regiment to rejoin shouldn't the stragglers rejoin some other regiment in their brigade or division? Amalgamation of units happened frequently towards the end of the war. Elimination of a unit in one scenario of a campaign should mean just that - for the rest of the campaign that unit's gone.

Comments please!



Chuck Berdanier
Col, 2/1/IX, AoO
National Light Infantry

This is entirely intended by the engine.

What it's simulating is simply that while the essential "integrity" of a unit may be removed for a given battle, between battles a cadre is able to reform (stragglers come back, the lightly wounded come back and so forth)

The engine can't really simulate combining gutted units very well, though I suppose you could do that mentally by keeping shredded battalions or even brigades together.

Major General Gary McClellan
1st Division, XXIII Corps
AoO,USA

Hi, Colonel,

I think I read that when a unit is wiped out, it comes back at 20% strength for the next battle of a campaign. I think this is supposed to represent men on leave, detached, lightly wounded, etc. Units that aren't wiped out get 10% of their strength back, I think. Rich Hamilton would know. Sections wiped out come back as one gun. While you make valid points, this feature is not without factual basis. I remember reading about an I Corps Union unit that had 80 men left on July 1, and I think around 200 after a couple of days in reserve. I just wish I could remember where I read it.

MG Mike Mihalik
1/III/AoMiss/CSA

Hmmmm......

Exactly where does the CSA go to get these cannons? It's not as if they could nip down to the shops and buy a dozen howitzers. In the campaign in question, the CSA lost about 40 guns between the first two games. Considering these both took place at Iuka and Price only had about 50 to begin with, where'd the extra guns come from?

During the third game (may attack on Ripley based on the attrition I'd caused the Army of the West vs. my smaller losses), all these artillery sections showed up on the rebel side. Is this accurate?

If troops and cannon can reappear, why not wounded leaders? Not all the wounds are mortal. BG Corse at Allatoona was quoted as saying "Have lost a cheekbone and part of an ear but can whip all hell yet!"



Chuck Berdanier
Col, 2/1/IX, AoO
National Light Infantry

For the cannon, I'd assume the "replaced" cannon are the one that were knocked off their carriage or the like that can be repaired, rather than those that were lost.

The engine isn't fully up to speed on distinguishing between cannon that are captured and those that are damaged, but overall, the engine does a fairly good job.

Major General Gary McClellan
1st Division, XXIII Corps
AoO,USA

Gen McClellan,

I guess that it's important who holds the field at the end of the day. Certainly in the east, a large ammount of the military equipment used by the CSA was gleaned from the battlefield. This wasn't near as much of a concern for the Union, but most of the rebel formations had little logistics support. Most rebel cavalrymen supplied their own horses.

The military supplies located at Iuka were one of the primary reasons Price went there in the first place. The fact they were guarded by a single large brigade under Murphy was a close second.

In my campaign, Price encountered Rosecrans with two divisions at Iuka and captured the town only after some bitter fighting (Minor CSA victory). Grant's ripost was to attack with five divisions and the attack from the rebel right flank was devastating, nearly destroying Little's division but certainly overunning and taking out what remained of the rebel artillery corps (Major USA victory). My thought at this time was that I had the CSA on the ropes and that it was time for the knockout punch. The following game was "Backs to the Wall" at Ripley which ended as a draw.

Remembering that it's not too important historicaly to the Union who holds the field but critical to the Rebels because of the differing nature of their logistic support, why do we then assume that the two forces reconstitute equally? We recognize the excellence of the rebel infantry and cavalry by their quality ratings. Can't we recognize the excellence of the Union logistics in how forces reconstitute?


Chuck Berdanier
Col, 2/1/IX, AoO
National Light Infantry

Hi, Colonel,

It is true that there is plenty of room for improvement in the HPS system, and your complaints are not invalid. But here is a quote from the book "Plowshares into Swords."

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">At the time Gorgas made his report to the Secretary of War for 1863 (on November 15) he remarked that "the army is now adequately supplied on this side of the Mississippi River with artillery quite equal to thet possessed by the enemy." His bureau had placed 677 guns in the field since the first of October, 1862, with an appropriate amount of ammunition.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Earlier it says 113 guns had been fabricated within the Confederacy between September 30, 1862 and September 30, 1863, while 239 had been purchased.

While this covers a period a little later than the one in which you are fighting, it is reasonable to believe that prior to that time artillery was being bought and manufactured, not to mention captured.

It is true that the Yankees had better logistics, which is reflected in higher levels of ammunition per gun/man in almost every scenario.
But while logistics was good, it wasn't miraculous. There are many instances of temporary shortages in Union armies because of outrunning their supply lines. The reason Grant's campaign did not go overland against Vicksburg was that when he tried it, Rebel cavalry destroyed his supply depot at Holly Springs and his rail line from Tennessee. In any case, guns didn't magically appear right after they were captured or destroyed. They had to be shipped from somewhere. I would think an army falling back on its depot would have a better chance of resupply than an army advancing away from its depot, even if the former was a Rebel army and the latter a Union one.

As to wounded officers, the wounds varied from very minor to permanently incapacitating. I'm sure HPS fudged and made the wound incapacitating for the duration of the campaign, which sounds pretty reasonable to me. In the case of General Corse, Sherman is reported to have said when he saw the actual injury, which was very minor, "They came damn near to missing you, didn't they, Corse?"

Anyway, so much in an HPS campaign depends on so many factors that are outside the scope of the game that you can't blame them for generalizing. We'll never know what the actual effect of your success would have been because historically it didn't happen. I think all the HPS campaign games have to interpolate historical events due to the what-if nature of the campaign system, but Corinth most of all.

MG Mike Mihalik
1/III/AoMiss/CSA

Sir,

Not disagreeing with you but following on to Col Gorgas' quote. The CSA fielded 677 arty pieces during the 13 months from 1 Oct 62 to 15 Nov 63. Of these, they manufactured 113 and imported a further 239. The remaining 325, had to have been battle damaged pieces, Union pieces that were made serviceable or pieces salvaged from prewar stocks. There were probably a number of sources for these pieces but up to this point in the war one of the notable features of the fighting was that the CSA held the field at the end of the fighting in the majority of the cases.

An analogy can be drawn to the German experience from 1939 thru 1942. During this time frame the Greman army certainly lost their share of tanks but were almost always able to recover, repair and return them to the field because they usually held the field at the end of the fight. Once the tide of war changed the opposite was true. They would often recover some or all of the crew but often not the vehicle. This meant they would need a new vehicle.

If we accept that an army falling back on it's stores would then draw out of those stores new equipment for the men, the premise is valid. Part of what I saying is that the stores for the CSA were no where near as comprehensive or complete as those for the Union and shouldn't be treated equally. Another part is noting that none of this happens nearly as quickly as the campaign moves (you have to allow time for the army to march, etc.).



Chuck Berdanier
Col, 2/1/IX, AoO
National Light Infantry