Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

Playing the Waterloo 388 turn monster scenario at the moment, so I find myself facing the same strategic/grand tactical choices facing Napoleon at the time. I wonder was the adoption of the "two wings and a reserve" approach an evolution of the "Army Carre" system used so prominently in 1805 and 1806, to one of higher levels of semi-autonomus command, or an approach forced on Napoleon by cicumstances. That is, was it an evolution in Napoleon's system of command or a retrograde step, forced on him by circumstances?


Certainly Napoleon used groups of corps in the campaigns of 1812 and 1813 and even earlier. On the other hand the theatres and forces involved in those campaigns would have made central control (in the old style) impossible, whereas in 1815, neither the forces involved nor the theatre were large, even by the standards of 1805. (I'm not talking about the various secondary forces guarding frontiers etc, just the main army.) Perhaps Napoleon's health forced the decision on him (evidenced by his lethargy on 16 June and his inability to exert effective control even on the battlefield at Waterloo).

The next question is, was the innovation a good one? On the one hand, with effective central direction, D'Erlon would not have spent the afternoon of 15 June wandering between Quatre bras and Ligny, arguably the worst mistake of the campaign. On the other, Labou was in the reserve (that is, directly under Napoleon's control) and was left so far away from the scene of the action that he could not intervene effectively at Ligny when he was eventually called upon, so one wonders how a staff that could "forget" one Corps would have handled the dispositions of 6 or 7 of them over the period of an intense campaign.

The outcome obviously was a disaster (for the French). But given the apparent state of the higher leadership - and of the staff - and (possibly) of Napoleon's health, would the system of independent corps have been any better? I doubt it.


Lt Colonel Neville Worland
2nd Régiment de Dragons
Ier Corps de Réserve de Cavalerie
Army du Nord

I don't know if history ever made a definitive determination about the first question. My interpretation of the events is that the 2 wings came about by circumstance. On the 15th, when the French crossed the boarder, there was only 1 army, not seperate wings. It was not till after the battles at Quatra Bras and Ligny that he split his command. I do not believe his health really had anything to do with it. QB and Ligny were too far apart for him to command both battles, and he knew it, so gave local command to Ney at QB. Again, when the Prussians retreated, they were too far from the Anglo-Allied forces for Napoleon to command both the attack on Wellington, and the pursuit of Blucher, so gave command to Grouchy to harrass the Prussians while he faced Wellington. Yes, he may have been lethargic on the 16th, and possibly that may have been influenced by poor health, and which also may very well have effected the use (or lack of use) of I and VI Corps, but the decision to split his army was Post Ligny, based on what he wanted to do given the circumstances at the time.
As for it being a good inovation or not, I'll say the decision was good, it was just poorly executed. Had I Corps been given to Ney, it most likely would have changed the outcome at QB. If Grouchy had "marched to the sound of the guns", Waterloo may very well have had a different outcome. Yes, he split his army, but it still fit his Central Position preference, it was only the execution that failed.
There are several other facets to this overall issue, such as choice of wing commanders, locations of armys relative to each other, aggressiveness of pursuit, utilization of assets, but they go outside the questions originally posed.


Cadet William Davis
Royal Military Academy

Napoleon was fighting along a distributed front such as Charles had done in Bavaria in 1809.

In this style of fighting the army is split into two or more wings. The CinC attempts through his staff system to control the commitment of troops to combat. Rarely does it work and in this case it surely didnt.

Some examples of this style of fighting:

1806 - Davout fighting at Auerstedt, Napoleon at Jena. The former was an able independent commander. The result was dramatic and far reaching. While Napoleon didnt have control over Davout (and Bernadotte) in Davout he had a great commander.

1809 - Bavaria - Charles entrusting Hiller to command the Left Wing with AdK Louis was a political choice - Hiller had clout with the Austrian Kaiser. The result was atypical - Hiller's wing fell apart. Charles was unable to command Hiller at all. Hiller should have been shot for his behaviour in 1809 except that he was the Kings buddy.

1815 - QB/Ligny - this was a distributed front again. Napoleon with the main army and Ney with the left wing. A BIG mistake. Would have been better just to mass against the Prussians and crushed them decisively than the give Ney an independent command (which is what it was for the most part).

A army of this period fighting on a distributed front needs:

1. A good set of subordinates - this was lacking in 1815.

2. A good wing commander for the portion not under the CinC. Ney was not a great wing commander but neither can Napoleon be found guiltless about the part that the I Corps played on the 16th.

3. A good army staff - Napoleon was lacking Berthier in 1815. His orders were not well communicated by Soult who was a poor choice for Chief of Staff. It would have been better to give him Ney's wing and keep Ney as a corps commander. But several authors have hinted that Napoleon didnt trust Soult and wanted to keep him under observation.

Question: are there so many Waterloo mysteries/mysiques because of the finality of the battle or because its just so popular? I have never seen a battle so discussed in Napoleonic history in such depth as Waterloo. Arguments have ensued over the color of the scarf that Wellington may have worn! Reminds me of the Bulge books.


Oberst Wilhelm Peters
2nd Kuirassiers, Reserve Korps, Austrian Army