Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

"The battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton."
--Arthur Wellesley

I just saw this quote today for the first time at the HPS website page for Waterloo. Never noticed it before.

Which leads me to ask: Was the Battle of Waterloo won by the Anglo-Allied army alone or did the Prussian intervention cause the victory?

Ok - committed to the flank to fight the Prussians:

VI Corps - (small corps - not the size of I or II Corps)
Young Guard - again a small formation
Cavalry - various but small amounts

In defense of the concept that the Anglo-Allied army won the battle:

1. Ney probably couldnt have won a major battle if he had a listening device planted on Wellington's cravat. He was a good corps comander, rearguard guy but not much better. Wing - perhaps, Bautzen was not really a good example as orders from Napoleon arrived late and so on.

2. Napoleon - an off day for him. Would another corps in his hands have made a difference? We will never know as Ney ran the battle for the most part.

3. French will to win. Sure, the French wanted to win. Noone doubts the drive for victory for this army. And since they were on the advance they had the initiative. But was it squanderered away in attacks on fixed positions? Hougomont has proven time and time again to have been a waste of good French infantry. In most games I have played as the French I just bypass it and take it later. Also - the French mid level officers were not their best. While some may defend the likes of D'Erlon and Reille you cant compare them to Lannes or Massena as corps commanders. I truly doubt if Lannes as commander of I Corps would have committed the blunder of putting his corps in such an odd formation reminiscent of the pike era! And Massena probably would have attack Hougomont but with less troops. However, note that he was the commander of the wing that held Aspern. Perhaps most commanders of this period had a fixture for fixtures!

4. Wellington - I admire this commander. I cant think of one commander who could direct his troops as well with his "on the field," "at the right spot at the right time" command presence. Even Napoleon would fail in this category in places. Wellington had this sixth sense of command that only men like Hannibal and Julius Caesar possess. Napoleon at Wagram for instance: he reacted to the Austrians and clearly did NOT have the initiative though he was the invader. Same at Friedland where his advanced corps almost got the snot knocked out of them. Jena - Lannes was stuck out on a limb - should the Prussians have pressed on to Jena he would have been in dire straights the evening prior to the battle.

Napoleon banked alot on his opponents not being up to his caliber of commander and I think that in the end this got him. Not being at the front like Wellington he became too committed to his staff system. Health issues as well which tell on any commander who spends as many hours in the saddle or at work like Le Tondu.

The negative side of Wellington's command system (at the front) like Charles of Austria - their HQs could fail to handle situations in their absence. Fortunately for the former he had a sense of where to be and when to be there. Charles often took personal command (not an uncommon thing in the Austrian and other Allied armies - i.e. Blucher at Auerstedt) and was away from his HQ TOO LONG. Wellington had the ability to be at the right place at the right time and then move back to his HQ or other key point of contention.

So in the end - was the victory of pure Anglo-Allied origin? Won on the playing fields of Eton? What about the Prussian reforms and Blucher's willingness to sacrifice his lines of communication in order to be a loyal ally?

For me the quote smacks too much of British-ism which while professional and so on often leads you to believe that the others were just supporting characters in a tragic play. Reminds me too much of the British in WW2. For those of you that remember, Churchill wanted to invade the Balkans! Now as Churchill was not up to the caliber of Wellington (remember Galipoli, Norway, etc) he does represent his country. Its a good thing that the British had good generals in WW2 who could stand up to Churchill at times even when it meant the chopping block and some HQ position back in England (Western Desert, etc). Otherwise the Allies could have found themselves trying to drive on Belgrade alongside the Russians. And probably mired down just like in Italy.

On the other hand, the US learned much from British professionalism and also from other Commonwealth nations such as Australia (insurgent warfare in Vietnam) and Canada and New Zealand. You cant blame the British military for Churchill's dabbling with the military.

I enjoy Wellington's quote that Waterloo was a "near run thing" and leave Eton out of it. (no knock on the HPS site guys - the quote is my point of interest here - not its selection by our guys)

For me Waterloo was a combined victory. A combination of bad generalship on Ney's part, Napoleon's absence from command, mediocre French mid-level leaders, fair to midland leaders on the Allied side, the drive of Blucher, the great command presence of Welligon ... and a willingness on the part of the assembled Allied troops to fight it out to end a empire.

Bill Peters
Former NWC President, Club Founder, Prussian and Austrian Army Founder

[url="http://www.fireandmelee.net"]Fire and Melee Wargame site[/url]

Bill

This quote was attributed to Wellington, but was first recorded about three years after his death!

It is considered doubtful that it was said by him, although he did attend Eton in the late 18C and re-visited the school in his later life.

So, I suspect that even if he had said it, it may well have been no more than the sort of throw-away line made by visitors to giving a talk at the school.

Did wellington / Anglo-Allies win single-handedly? No the Prussians joined the battle.

Would Wellington have won without the Prussians - We'll never know for sure.

Would Wellington have given battle had he thought that the Prussians were not coming - almost certainly not, but again, we will not know for certain.

I recently read that there is a school of thought that says that Wellington may have been aware of the approach of the Prussians considerably earlier than has been generally accepted, and significantly earlier than the French were aware of their approach. This would undoubtedly have influenced his decisions and actions during the course of the day

Regards

Mark

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Mark Eason</i>
<br />Bill

This quote was attributed to Wellington, but was first recorded about three years after his death!

It is considered doubtful that it was said by him, although he did attend Eton in the late 18C and re-visited the school in his later life.

So, I suspect that even if he had said it, it may well have been no more than the sort of throw-away line made by visitors to giving a talk at the school.

Did wellington / Anglo-Allies win single-handedly? No the Prussians joined the battle.

Would Wellington have won without the Prussians - We'll never know for sure.

Would Wellington have given battle had he thought that the Prussians were not coming - almost certainly not, but again, we will not know for certain.

I recently read that there is a school of thought that says that Wellington may have been aware of the approach of the Prussians considerably earlier than has been generally accepted, and significantly earlier than the French were aware of their approach. This would undoubtedly have influenced his decisions and actions during the course of the day

Regards

Mark
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Good comments Mark. Now that makes you wonder. Would Wellington have risked a major engagment with Napoleon unless he knew for sure that the Prussians were coming.

One of those questions that comes up like those about Gettysburg concerning Meade and his generals. Would Meade have fought at Gettysburg unless he knew the VI Corps would arrive? I doubt it.

However, unless Wellington sticks it out there near Brusselles the gap between him and the Prussians widens. Operationally, falling back on the part of Wellington would have worked in Napoleon's favor. Perhaps Wellington had that in mind as well.

1815 was a real patchwork affair on all sides. Only the Prussians had commanders that were used to each other to some extent. The French had alot of Peninsular commanders that hadnt seen a victory in years. The Anglo-Allies were an untested command team.

Good comments.

Bill Peters
Former NWC President, Club Founder, Prussian and Austrian Army Founder

[url="http://www.fireandmelee.net"]Fire and Melee Wargame site[/url]

Napoleon wins if; He took Davout with him, put Soult in charge of a corps or wing in place of the Ney, Davout in place of Grouchy, maybe even take Suchet along. Wellington looses if the Prussians fail to make it there.

Maréchal Tony R.Malone, Comte d'Auvergne et Duc de Vauchamps: Division d'Infanterie de la Moyenne Garde; CDR III Corps Armee Du Nord
"The Guard may die, But it never surrenders".

I would agree, not from a bias stance but a logical one, that Wellington has a hard time winning without Prussia. Keep in mind that Prussia keeps Grouchy occupied at Wavre, another key point and does exactly what Napoleon is famous for, divide and conquer.

I know it is a joke when I say Promise not Forgotten, but Blucher's own character was one that holds true to this statement. He very much was man of what he said he would do, and important because unlike Gnesienau, he knew that they needed to co-operate as one force to end the war once and for all and that included the Austrian's and Russian's. When Napoleon comes back it is Wellington as the driving force to make the Congress of Vienna fight and make terms with Napoleon was ONE force combined. Something that until 1813-4 had never been done in earnest. Napoleon is very much only sucessful on being able to make seperate terms with each nation and alllowing him to balance and counterbalance them off of each other and shift forces while at peace with one to another one. 1813-4 in my opinion sees all of Europe in a sort of orchestrated effort against Napoleon, which is key and shows the weakness of having everyone going at your juggular. The Allied Coalition sees this and remembers it in 1815. Blucher and Wellington combined are a force of a very powerful nature, one that if you combined both of them would create quite the officer. Both their strengths and weaknesses compliment each other nicely.

The sad part is Napoleon did look at this as just another battle, he did not udnerstand that the Coalition wanted it over once and for all. He was somewhat cocky and confident that day. Everything that was in his doctrine the Allied forces understood and if they forgot anything Ligny and Quatre Bras reminded them in time.

It reminds me of the movie "Patton" where when Rommel's tanks are approcahing the pass George C. Scott, who plays Patton, starts to defeat Rommel's tanks and yells something to the effect of, "Rommel you SOB I read your book!". This rings clear in my mind with the forces of the Allied Coalition in 1815, I feel that they had all together a firm grasp around Napoleon's head.

Let us not forget that the Dutch at Quatre Bras buy important time for Wellington to assemble his army even though it was at the expense of the Prussian's. Even with their retreat it is key that Prussia did fall back in the direction of Wellington.

The Anglo-Dutch I feel had quite the competant people in their forces, enough to beat Nappy that day. Let us not forget that Lord Rowland Hill is quite the experienced officer, with some very good men underneath him. Even with the questionable Dutch, who I feel are far from questionable and were a very valueable asset to the fight, let us not forget that real credit goes to the 3rd DB Division for turning the Old Guard back.

Again Prussia's enterance on the field forces Napoleon to react and he looses the initiative and in my opinion control of the battle. Many things change history that day, but Wellington was just one of the many reasons why, not the single one.

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Several good points here... The cause however may go back further to the beginning of the French Empire.

One of the points that is made clear in "The Campaigns of Napoleon" by Chandler is that Napoleon's Marechals were always kept on a tight leash while Napoleon was around. They lacked any real confidence in their own abilities in large scale command.. with the exception of Davout. Simply put, Napoleon did not train his commanders but gave orders without explaining the big picture.

In Spain you will recall that Napoleon was not there much to direct the actual battle to the degree that he would have normally. As a result his subordinates were left to fend for themselves and did a poor job of it. Wellington looks good in Spain because he was not facing anything special in
the Commanders that were on the French side.

If you require another example you will remember Berthier's mistakes in the opening of the 1809 Campaign that very nearly lost it before it began.

Now we come to Waterloo....

I am in agreement that Soult should have been left in France and Davout should have been there, which points to another real problem.. Napoleon was not aware of the real abilities of his commanders.

The real fault at Waterloo is Napoleon's alone.... He left the field to Ney who wasted all the beautiful cavalry on senseless charges that were not backed by infantry. I do not mean to imply that Ney was not courageous, just reckless.

If Napoleon had "trained" his commanders from the start this never would have happened.




Monsieur le Marechal Baron John Corbin
Duc de Paive
Commanding the Division de Cavalerie de la Jeune Garde
NWC President

I can agree that many of Napoleon's Marshals lacked ability in large independant commands, I think Soult would have been better off in a command of a Corps or Wing, not in Paris, and sure not as a chief of staff. Ney in charge of a corps under Napoleon's eyes is well suited. As for Spain I think Soult proved to be a capable independant commander against Wellington, and Suchet was by far Napoleon's best down there. I will agree that Napoleon is to blame for the loss at Waterloo, He made poor choices in the placement of his commanders, and he failed to control the battle and let Ney run a muck. And of course his biggest mistake was making Grouchy a Marshal and giving him an independant command. Of course as I thought, I am sure everyone will agree that Napoleon should have taken Davout along. The Waterloo campaign reminds me of his Liepzig disaster, he made poor choices there also, and again left Davout out of the fighting.

Maréchal Tony R.Malone, Comte d'Auvergne et Duc de Vauchamps: Division d'Infanterie de la Moyenne Garde; CDR III Corps Armee Du Nord
"The Guard may die, But it never surrenders".

Mssrs.,

I agree that many factors went into the Allied victory at Waterloo, but there's no doubt in my mind that the arrival of the Prussians on the field was the indispensible, <i>sine qua non</i> of that victory. Yes, in the end only a small portion of <i>L'Armee du Nord</i> was actually commited to fight the advancing Prussians. Their arrival, nonetheless, fatally disrupted the pace of the French attack.

Despite his many errors, Ney HAD managed to bring the Anglo/Allied Center to the breaking point, notably after the capture of La Haye Sainte. The commitment of fresh troops at this juncture would have ruptured the A/A Center and completed the victory. Neither VIC nor the Garde were committed, however, because the unexpected arrival of Blucher's men created a new crisis to be dealt with. If the trrops committed vs. the Prussians had, instead, launched a fresh attack against Wellington's forces, the A/A lines would have collapsed. Ney launched the fruitless, unsupported cav charges precisely because Napoleon refused to provide Ney with additional, fresh infantry at the critical juncture. By the time the OG was finally launched, Weelington had the benefit of 2 precious hours during which he was able to rally and reform the troops shattered after the fall of La Haye Sainte.

And, yes, Blucher proved a far more dependable ally than Wellington. Hofschroer has, IMO, made a convincing case for the proposition that Wellington knowingly lied to Blucher on June 16, promising to assist him at Ligny when in fact he knew that his forces could not possibly arrive in time to support the Prussians on the 16th. But for the initiative of the DB commanders, there wouldn't even have been a battle at QB[:(!]. Blucher, on the other hand, scrupulously honored his promise to support Wellington on the 18th, even against the advice of his own subordinates.

Regards,

Paco

<i>Maréchal</i> M. Francisco Palomo
<i>Prince d'Essling, Grande Duc d'Abrantes et
Comte de Marseille
Commandant - Division de Cavalerie de la Vieille Garde </i>

Davout was 'the Iron Marshal' let us not forget his devotion to Napoleon, and the awe he inspired/terror he struck (you choose) in the hearts of men.

Take him out of Paris and the political enemies of Napoleon turn against Napoleon as he approaches the border. The Waterloo campaign is a non-started as civil war erupts, or just chaos with the army not getting any, meaningful logistics support (deprived by newly declared government), and Wellington/BLucher march to support said new government leaving Napoleon no choice but to flee without any attempt at last minute heroics.

Only two men in 1815 could keep Paris loyal to Napoleon. They were Napoleon and Davout, and as goes Paris so goes France.

Blucher and Wellington decided to stick together no matter what, lose either man during the course of the campaign, and his army retires after QB/Ligny battles leaving the other army to be destroyed at Napoleon's leisure.

Replacing individual commanders here or there would make no difference in the long run of things, or even most short term events. What Napoleon needed, and the Allies would not give him, was time. Had he had 9 - 12 months to secure his base, reform his army, retrain the men, the staff, the officers to acclimate themselves to each other, and to secure allies of his own ...

THEN Napoleon has a chance of beating the Allies in a limited campaign that would result in him remaining on France's throne. The extra time (initial 9 - 12 months) would have had allow him to have diplomatic channels opened to other governments to accept an offer of peace for his position in France, which could have been floated after opening lighting victories. (Although the first sign of aggression or expansion, and Europe would take up arms again to oust him.)

Colonel Al Amos
1erè Brigade Commandant
2ème Division de Dragons

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Al Amos</i>
<br />Davout was 'the Iron Marshal' let us not forget his devotion to Napoleon, and the awe he inspired/terror he struck (you choose) in the hearts of men.

Take him out of Paris and the political enemies of Napoleon turn against Napoleon as he approaches the border. The Waterloo campaign is a non-started as civil war erupts, or just chaos with the army not getting any, meaningful logistics support (deprived by newly declared government), and Wellington/BLucher march to support said new government leaving Napoleon no choice but to flee without any attempt at last minute heroics.

Only two men in 1815 could keep Paris loyal to Napoleon. They were Napoleon and Davout, and as goes Paris so goes France.

Blucher and Wellington decided to stick together no matter what, lose either man during the course of the campaign, and his army retires after QB/Ligny battles leaving the other army to be destroyed at Napoleon's leisure.

Replacing individual commanders here or there would make no difference in the long run of things, or even most short term events. What Napoleon needed, and the Allies would not give him, was time. Had he had 9 - 12 months to secure his base, reform his army, retrain the men, the staff, the officers to acclimate themselves to each other, and to secure allies of his own ...

THEN Napoleon has a chance of beating the Allies in a limited campaign that would result in him remaining on France's throne. The extra time (initial 9 - 12 months) would have had allow him to have diplomatic channels opened to other governments to accept an offer of peace for his position in France, which could have been floated after opening lighting victories. (Although the first sign of aggression or expansion, and Europe would take up arms again to oust him.)

Colonel Al Amos
1erè Brigade Commandant
2ème Division de Dragons


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I agree with your analysis of Davout but I disagree that Napoleon had much political clout with which to use for the courts of Austria, Russia, Sweden, etc.

As a matter of fact I feel that his lack of information about the Congress of Vienna probably lead to his downfall more than any one significant action on a field of battle.

Had he WAITED and seen how the Allies were going to basically abandon the Congress he would have reaped a much better harvest.

And had he given the French people some time to be tired of the monarchy via spies (remember, this IS Elba we are talking about and not St. Helena - he had visitors coming and going all of the time) he might have timed his move to coincide with a rising wave of patriotic fervor.

Instead he showed up barely one year later from his abdication and thus didnt give himself much time in which to work with.

I have always felt that he should have bided his time. Let France grow into unrest under the king and then returned as their saviour.

Dont you feel that if another commander had lead the II Corps or at least some of its divisions that the outcome on that flank would have been different. If you are going to beat Wellington you must bypass such features as La Haye Sainte and the Hougomont.

Bill Peters
Former NWC President, Club Founder, Prussian and Austrian Army Founder

[url="http://www.fireandmelee.net"]Fire and Melee Wargame site[/url]

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Bill Peters</i>
I have always felt that he should have bided his time. Let France grow into unrest under the king and then returned as their saviour.
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Bill,

Your reference to Napoleon biding his time reminds me of a wonderful little film starring Ian Holm, <u>The Emperor's New Clothes</u>, which posits that Napoleon managed to escape from St. Helena by leaving a "double" to take his place as he makes his way to France. The plot, of course, goes aglee, <i>inter alia</i> the double, a down at the heels common sailor, decides life as an exiled Emperor is far too good a thing to pass up and refuses to "unmask" himself (the Brit guards are too stupid to tell the difference[:p]).

The best part of the film, however, is what the real Napoleon ends up doing when he discovers that the plan has unravelled. Napoleon had been sheltering in the home of a loyal officer's widow desperately trying to make ends meet by selling produce. With creditors and a "wolf" almost literally at the, of course, beautiful widow's door, Napoleon intervenes by turning his organizational genius to the business of selling cabbages[:o)]! In a hilarious sequence, he analyses a map of Paris' retail establishments, assembles his "troops" and conquers the green grocer trade (and the widow[8D])!

Regards,

Paco

<i>Maréchal</i> M. Francisco Palomo
<i>Prince d'Essling, Grande Duc d'Abrantes et
Comte de Marseille
Commandant - Division de Cavalerie de la Vieille Garde </i>

<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by paco</i>
<br /><blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Bill Peters</i>
I have always felt that he should have bided his time. Let France grow into unrest under the king and then returned as their saviour.
<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

Bill,

Your reference to Napoleon biding his time reminds me of a wonderful little film starring Ian Holm, <u>The Emperor's New Clothes</u>, which posits that Napoleon managed to escape from St. Helena by leaving a "double" to take his place as he makes his way to France. The plot, of course, goes aglee, <i>inter alia</i> the double, a down at the heels common sailor, decides life as an exiled Emperor is far too good a thing to pass up and refuses to "unmask" himself (the Brit guards are too stupid to tell the difference[:p]).

The best part of the film, however, is what the real Napoleon ends up doing when he discovers that the plan has unravelled. Napoleon had been sheltering in the home of a loyal officer's widow desperately trying to make ends meet by selling produce. With creditors and a "wolf" almost literally at the, of course, beautiful widow's door, Napoleon intervenes by turning his organizational genius to the business of selling cabbages[:o)]! In a hilarious sequence, he analyses a map of Paris' retail establishments, assembles his "troops" and conquers the green grocer trade (and the widow[8D])!

Regards,

Paco

<i>Maréchal</i> M. Francisco Palomo
<i>Prince d'Essling, Grande Duc d'Abrantes et
Comte de Marseille
Commandant - Division de Cavalerie de la Vieille Garde </i>

<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">

I always wondered where Carrol got that famous line "of cabbages and kings" [8D]

Bill Peters
Former NWC President, Club Founder, Prussian and Austrian Army Founder

[url="http://www.fireandmelee.net"]Fire and Melee Wargame site[/url]