Some general remarks:
1. The suspicion of bias in itself doesn't mean or prove anything. If all French writers would agree that the Russian soldier of 1812 was a dumb peasant of little military value and all Russian writers would agree that, conversely, he was a highly motivated effective defender of the motherland, that would tell us something about French-Russian antagonism but not much about the Russian soldier. In absence of other evidence, both interpretations have an equal claim to be true. There is no law that says biased accounts are per se false, or that the truth has to be in the middle. It's history, not math.
2. Still, while in history there is no law of probability, nor any laws, and the improbable is always at least possible, there is still the rules of plausible interpretation which apply until conclusive evidence to the contrary can be provided. Roughly it's the same as the law that reportedly exists in natural science which says that, all else being equal, the simplest interpretation tends to be true.
Applied to the 1812 campaign, that means that, if we have the following suppositions--
a. The combined Russian armies were about the size of the Grande Armée at Borodino, and outnumbered it significantly afterwards until the conclusion of the campaign. (Does anyone challenge that statement?)
b. The Russian armies did not effectively contest the advance of the Grande Armée until Borodino, and did not make a concerted and effective effort to impede its retreat after Maloyaroslavets. (Will anyone challenge this? I think one doesn't need intimate knowledge of the individual engagements in the campaign to prove it.)
c. By doing so, the Russian armies accepted the devastation of a large stretch of their country, the destruction of their capital, and the escape of the essential cadres of the Grande Armée that enabled its resurrection (if fundamentally weakened) in 1813 and again in 1815. (I think that's evident and doesn't need further proof.)
--then what is the plausible interpretation? That they did all that in spite of the highly superior quality of their armies? Historically, on average inferior armies avoid battle; superior armies seek it. Now if the Russian armies were both numerically at least the equal, after Moscow definitely superior to the Grande Armée, *and* they were also of better quality (as per Poruchik Alexey Tartyshev's claim), then why did they avoid battle against an inferior army, accepting considerable damage to private and public property? Of course, it's possible; humans don't always act rational, and there was, afterall, McClellan at Yorktown. But since it's highly unlikely, it needs conclusive proof.
3. Battles: As I said, am not all that well read in the tactical battles of the campaign. I am genuinly looking forward to evidence of a conclusive Russian victory in the campaign, preferably one won by inferior numbers, that would substantiate the claim of the superior quality of the Russian soldier, compared to his French/Allied counterpart. Personally, I would count most battles in the campaign as somewhere between tactically inconclusive and outright Russian defeat, with the arguable exception of Vinkovo and Valutina. Some combine tactical defeat with a crushing operational defeat (Berezina). I can't wait to hear more from people who have studied the battles.
4. I can also summarize my point in a single observation: if NRC is an accurate portrayal of the Russian as compared to the French army, the Russian campaign would have ended at Smolensk. Because I doubt there is any way in which the Grande Armée can defeat the combined Russian armies there in the game.
5. Finally, my friends, please don't think I have to biased because I carry a French baton. I am greatly fascinated with the Russian campaign and my sympathies are definitely as much with the Russian as with the Allied side. (Afterall, I am half Southern German, half Prussian, and even though you guys sold us out at Tilsit, you liberated us from the French yoke after Kalish. [8D] And also our best generals fought on your side.) At one point I almost joined the Russian army in the club and only the fact that I have no clue of the language kept me because I didn't want to get all the terms wrong. [;)] I have definitely played NRC more often from the Russian side and enjoyed leading this fine army, but now that I know the other side I am somewhat disappointed because it appears it was not my superior generalship that won most my NRC battles, playing Russian, but rather the bias of the game.
6. Summing up, I think I agree with Anton (and Rich said it several times before) that there should be a formal process for establishing unit quality, according to training and experience of the units in question, not according to how we think an army should behave in the game. Unit quality is a very poor shortcut to historical battle results. What it can do, unhistorically, to mess up a game is amply born out by the Reb supermen in the BG ACW games. And in NRC it seems to be worse because unit quality seems to have been used to make unhistorical battle victories possible to achieve a historical campaign outcome.
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D.S. "Green Horse" Walter, Maréchal d'Empire
Duc des Pyramides, Comte de Normandie
Commandant la [url="http://home.arcor.de/dierk_Walter/NWC/3_VI_AdR_Home.htm"]3e Division Bavaroise[/url], L'Armée du Rhin
Commandant [url="http://home.arcor.de/dierk_Walter/NWC/EdM_start.htm"]L'Ecole de Mars[/url], L'Armée du Rhin
Commandant la Brigade de Grenadiers de la Moyenne Garde
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