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EPISODE 1.29 -
June 17, 2005
Picturing the Past
Guest: Eric Wittenberg
From the novelty of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry (Rush's Lancers), to the stand of John Buford at Gettysburg, to a sharply critical view of Phil Sheridan, Eric J. Wittenberg offers a variety of interesting views on the men who led and served in the Union cavalry. Union cavalry expert Eric J. Wittenberg, author of Little Phil: A Reassessment of the Civil War Leadership of Gen. Philip H. Sheridan.
Blake's Review:
The conversation begins with the usual small talk about how Eric grew interested in Civil War history. They then shift to Eric's interest in the Union Cavalry and the role it played in the Civil War.
The first cavalry related issues they discuss is the unusual history of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, or Rush's Lancers, named after it's colonel Richard Rush. Rush, the grandson of Benjamin Rush, signer of the Declaration of Independence, was a West Point graduate of the class of 1846. In November of 1861, McClellan asked Rush about arming his cavalry regiment with lancers which would be nine feet long and have 11-inch three pointed blades on one end and a ferrule on the other. The unit did make three cavalry charges with the lances during the war that Eric can confirm through his research. He states the weapons did achieve their purpose of striking fear into infantrymen and causing them to rout rather than attempt to tangle with the lances in an open field. But by 1863 the War Department chose to rearm the regiment with carbines which were more practical as the uses of cavalry evolved during the war.
Gerry asks why the Union cavalry was perpetually behind the Confederate cavalry at the start of the war.
"Well, there's a lot of reasons for that, and they're really fairly complicated. First and foremost, Winfield Scott himself was vigorously opposed to the idea of raising volunteer cavalry regiments." Eric states that the conventional wisdom was that a good cavalry unit would take three to five years to train and that many people thought the war would be over in a shorter period of time. "Mix in the fact that it typically cost up to $300,000 to mount and equip the cavalry regiment." Winfield Scott wanted to only use the regular U.S. Cavalry in 1861. But this was soon realized to be inadequate and people like Carl Schurz acted to raise the first Federal volunteer cavalry regiment, the 1st NY Lincoln Volunteers. Another reason the Confederates has the advantage was that the Confederacy simply had more natural horsemen. The Confederates were more likely to bring their own horses into the service and already knew how to care for them. The Federal volunteers had to learn all of that. A number of high-ranking Confederate leaders were also former cavalry officers, like Lee. The Confederate leaders used their cavalry much better in the early part of the war with men like Lee in command who could utilize the skills of Jeb Stuart to terrorize the poorly led Union cavalry.
Eric also talks about how the Federals attached their cavalry to the infantry units and used as orderlies and messengers as opposed scouting, screening, and reconnaissance. "I think of all the army commanders the Union had, John Pope probably best understood the role that cavalry could play. And it was Pope who actually first brigaded volunteer cavalry units in the East during what became the Second Manassas Campaign, and they did very well indeed." McClellan would later create a full cavalry corps for the Antietam Campaign but it was Hooker who fully implemented the idea when he took over in 1863 and this is "when the tide really began to turn."
Eric talks about John Buford's efforts at recon during the Second Manassas Campaign as being "some of the finest recon work done in all of the American Civil War. Buford, himself, sat up on a bluff at Gainesville and personally counted the regiments of Longstreet's Corps marching by on their way to the battlefield of Second Manassas. He sent the intel on to General Ricketts, who sent it on to Irvin McDowell, who for reasons which remain a mystery, stuck the dispatches in pocket and sat on it for a number of hours before he bothered to pass it on to Pope, and of course Pope didn't believe him. But that's certainly not Buford's fault that those things happened but the point is he did some of the most brilliant scouting and recon work done during the war and this was as early as August 1862."
They then discuss weapon technology and how it effected the usage of cavalry and their tactics with repeating rifles.
"Who are the best of the Union cavalry leaders", Gerry asks. Eric replies, "there is no doubt in my mind that the finest Union cavalry officer produced in all of the war was John Buford." Buford has pre-war service in the dragoons which gave him experience going into the war in cavalry tactics both mounted and dismounted. "Buford proved his merit on the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg conducting an absolutely textbook covering force action which is still taught in classrooms today." He goes on to talk about how the tactics of Buford were adopted by NATO during the Cold War and incorporated into envisioned battle plans against the Soviets.
They then talk about Custer. Eric discusses the problem with viewing Custer is that his legacy in the Civil War is overshadowed by what happened after it. But that his Civil War service is viewed by itself, "he may very well be remembered as the greatest cavalryman America ever produced. The guy had an ability to inspire men to follow his lead. And he has this perception of being reckless, and in some ways he was, but he had the courage of a lion and his men loved him and they, literally, would have followed him into hell at least during the Civil War." He discusses Custer's pros and cons and admits, "Custer is a bit of a double-edged sword. He is a glory hunter, he is a guy who was interested in promoting himself and advancing his own career. At the same time though he was a guy that his men loved. And that's an interesting combination because there certainly were plenty of officers who the men in the ranks despised and Custer was rarely one of those men."
Turning to Pleasonton, Eric and Gerry discuss why Pleasonton has been all but forgotten. Pleasonton, simply, was a lead from the rear kind of guy, terrible self-promoter, could not tell the truth, not very brave, "a conniver, a schemer, and he stabbed George Meade in the back."
What about Sheridan? "I think it's fairly well-known to those familiar with my work that I am not an admirer of Sheridan. Particularly during his tenure as commander of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac. For one thing, the man was grossly insubordinate and he got away with, basically, telling the army commander George Meade off. And instead of being relieved of command when Meade told Grant about it... Grant instead gave Sheridan an independent command." Eric continues to talk about the insubordination of Sheridan in the east, "and what astounds me is that he was constantly rewarded for that by giving increased levels of responsibility in command."
You can tell Gerry isn't agreeing and he argues back that, "but you might say nothing succeeds like success, and as unpleasant as it might be to serve as a colleague of Sheridan... he keeps winning."
Eric isn't having it. "Well, that's have a real good look at that Gerry!" He then breaks down Sheridan's tenure as cavalry commander in the Army of the Potomac ("about 90 days in the field in early 1864.") "I will suggest to you," he tells Gerry, "that his battlefield record during that period of time was something like 2-12-1. In the NFL head coaches get fired for posting records like that. Instead, Sheridan gets promoted to a department commander in August 1864. Why? I'm not sure. I've never been able to come up with a good answer to that question other than Grant's own words suggested he had a great deal of confidence in Sheridan's abilities. But as a commander of cavalry his record really wasn't very good at all and it is kind of astonishing to me that he is considered to be this tremendous cavalry commander when he really wasn't. And maybe it is because of the last nine days of the war." He then talks about the Appomattox Campaign where he admits that Sheridan performed extremely well. "But it also bears noting that he had no business being there because he had direct orders from Grant" which did not include riding south to join the main campaign against Lee. "He disobeyed a direct order from Grant. What's his reward? Grant makes him a Wing Commander. I don't get it."
Overall, this is an amusing interview to listen to. The fact that Eric is on a road trip and talking from a truck stop while taking a break kind of adds some amusement as well. You can sometimes here the truck stop ambiance of doors closing and the audio announcing when shower's are free for truck drivers to use.
_________________ Gen. Blake Strickler
Confederate General-in-Chief
El Presidente 2010 - 2012
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