For those not familiar with General Whitehead's references to the "Mule Shoe", here is a web page that attempts to explain it.
http://www.civilwarbattlefields.us/spot ... _shoe.htmlI agree that an attacker can mass against a weak point in the defender's line, but maintain that in doing so, he exposes himself to possible isolation and counterattack. In most scenarios I play the attacker doesn't enjoy such a superiority of numbers that he can steamroll the opposition without putting elements of his own command at risk. Those that do probably get played by me but once.
But that brings up other weaknesses in the HPS system; a lack of realism in stacking and command and control.
Looking in Gottfried's book Maps of Gettysburg, we see Pender's Division of roughly 5000 men covering a frontage of about 1400 yards. This comes to a little over 400 men/120 yds. This was probably the maximum number of men who could fire on that frontage. But with HPS 1000 men can fire from a 120 yd hex at full effect.
I remember Frost and Norris modified some Talonsoft scenarios by changing max stacking to 400 men. I played a couple of those scenarios, and I can recall very little melee. That was, of course, a different melee system.
By command and control, I mean the ability to instantaneously issue orders to disparate stacks to converge on a particular hex. Historically, it took a lot of time to formulate a plan and then communicate it down the chain of command. In fact, the 360-yd span of control of a brigade commander sounds awfully optimistic to me. Coordination was extremely difficult, especially in a situation constantly changing.
I think these things are more responsible for unrealistic casualties than excessive melee ever was.