KWhitehead wrote:
Lee and Jackson's tactics in the face of overwhelming numbers is generally considered my millitary historians a brilliant example of using a smaller force to overcome a larger.
Chancellorsville is an example of a smaller force overcoming a larger force handicapped by incompetent leadership.
For Lee's plan to work, several things had to happen:
1) Jackson had to make a 12-mile (19 km) march via roundabout roads to reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected.
2) Hooker had to stay tamely on the defensive.
3) Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up at Fredericksburg, despite the four-to-one Union advantage there.
4) when Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the Union forces were unprepared.
Based on the above, I would say Lee got lucky - very lucky - at Chancellorsville. Despite being in a potentially favorable situation on May 1st, Hooker halted his brief offensive. His actions demonstrated his lack of confidence in handling large formations for the first time. Hooker's subordinates were surprised and outraged by his decision to withdraw to defensive lines around Chancellorsville. What's worse, Hooker left his right flank (XI Corps) "in the air." Significant contributors to the Union disaster was the incompetent performance of XI Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Howard failed to make any provision for defending against a surprise attack, even though Hooker had ordered him to do so. Union cavalry commander Stoneman was a disappointment in the strategic role. During the entire battle, Stoneman accomplished little and Hooker considered him one of the principal reasons for the Union defeat at Chancellorsville.
I would categorize Lee at Chancellorsville as being audacious, bold, daring and his deployments as very risky. Lee violated one of the generally accepted principles of war and divided his force in the face of a superior enemy. I do not consider Lee's decisions as "briliant" because the Confederate victory was in large part due to dismal Union leadership. Lee, with a significant loss of 22% of his force, did not succeeded in destroying the AotP as a fighting entity, merely foiled Hooker's plans. It is doubtful anyone could have performed worse than Hooker at Chancellorsville. Aggressive and confident Union commanders like Grant, Sheridan, Sherman, Thomas.. would certainly have done much better.
KWhitehead wrote:
Longstreet was critical of a lot things Lee did.
I don't necessarily agree with Longstreet's criticism of Leet at Chancellorsville. It cannot be denied that Lee gambled heavily at Chancellorsville and won. As I said, I don't know what alternative - if any - Longstreet recommended or suggested. Another defensive battle like Fredericksburg? However, Longstreet's criticism of Lee at Gettysburg certainly had some merit.[background=][/background]