I recently watched the episode. I reserve comment on which side benefits more from MOP. I respect Blake's mathematics which concluded that neither side benefitted from having MOP checked and that in the end there was little difference between the two. However, that is not my main concern.
My main concern is in improving the simulation value of the games. Accordingly, I got very interested when it got to the part about the historical justification of it. Had someone finally found some historical justification for MOP? It appeared so as there were quotes from Cleburne's official report on the Battle of Shiloh. Those quotes, together with the commentary, seemed to show that mixing units from different brigades had had an adverse affect.
The QuotesVideo Quote 1I was now left without a command on this part of the field, and was proceeding along the rear of our line to join my left wing, when I met General Hardee. I reported my situation to him. He ordered me to collect and bring into the fight a large body of stragglers who were thronging the encampments in our rear.
Video Quote 2I received orders from General Hardee to advance on the Bark road.
With the gallant few still with me I advanced about a mile to a place where I found a line of battle. It was halted, and, I was informed, was a part of General Breckinridge’s command.
Video Quote 3An officer now bore me an order from General Breckinridge to move forward with his line and attack the force in our front. I sent back word that I was completely without support and outflanked on the left and would be destroyed if I advanced. I received for answer that the order was from General Bragg, that it was positive, and I must immediately advance.
Video Quote 4My brigade was repulsed and almost completely routed in this unfortunate attack.
My brigade was now completely scattered and disorganized. Many of my officers and men continued fighting in the ranks of other commands or on their own responsibility, but not again in any organization which I could control.
So, it certainly seemed from the quotes and commentary that due to Cleburne being in control of units outside his brigade caused problems thus justifying MOP. I needed to learn more about this so I went to the actual report which can be found here (https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924077730160&seq=598&q1=).I found Video Quote 1 in the report and began to read. In the very next sentence Cleburne says:
This, after great exertion, I partially succeeded in doing, but finding this kind of a force would not stand anything like a heavy fire, I determined to rejoin my own command on the left, which I did about 2 p. m.
So, all the following quotes relate to Cleburne’s Brigade not the "large body of stragglers" (brigade/s unknown).In Video Quote 2, in between the words “Bark Road” and “With the gallant few” the report has:
I reformed my brigade and fired off my wet guns.
My brigade was sadly reduced. From near 2,700 I now numbered about 800. Two regiments, the Second Tennessee and Sixth Mississippi, were absent altogether. Hundreds of my best men were dead or in the hospitals, and, I blush to add, hundreds of others had run off early in the fight of the day before—some through cowardice and some loaded with plunder from the Yankee encampments.
Both Sixth Mississippi and Second Tennessee are from Cleburne’s Brigade However, as both were “absent altogether” it is neither here nor there. That passage of the report is referring to Cleburne’s own brigade.
Note: Second Tennessee is interesting. There is another Second Tennessee in B. R. Johnson’s Brigade. Johnson’s 2nd Tenn. is shown here (
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924077730160&seq=400&q1=) and Cleburne’s 2nd Tenn. gets a mention on the following page as an * in the footnote.
I have nothing to add regarding Video Quote 3 except to say that Cleburne is still with his brigade,
not commanding a “large body of stragglers”.
In Video Quote 4, between the words “unfortunate attack” and “My brigade” the report has the following:
As far as I know the Fifteenth Arkansas was the only regiment rallied anywhere near the scene of disaster. In the face of a deadly fire and an exultant foe the regiment reformed near two abandoned cannons and fell back in order behind a ridge. From this point, seeing some re-enforcements coming up, I led them in a charge on the advancing foe. The enemy fled back faster than they came.
In this charge Lieutenant-Colonel Patton, the sole remaining field officer of the Fifteenth Arkansas, was shot dead. He did his duty nobly in this battle and secured the love and confidence of every man in his regiment. The Fifteenth Arkansas continued to pursue the enemy until out of ammunition, when 58 men, all that were still together, fell back to replenish.
15th Arkansas is another regiment from Cleburne’s Brigade.
ConclusionI’m sorry Blake, no historical justification for MOP in that instance. Cleburne was in charge of his own brigade. All he did with the “large body of stragglers” was cobble them into a defensive line (not a strong one) before returning to his brigade within the hour.
There were lots of problems at Shiloh (for both sides) but having units from different brigades within the same 125 yard area was not one of them. The men at Shiloh were probably pretty glad to have as many friends with them as possible and no problem with what brigade they emanated from.
The two 2nd Tenn. was an odd discovery but one of things this is strange but true. I'm always pleased when I learn something new.
I remain committed to my claim that there is no historical justification for MOP. Indeed, I have examples of 'mixing' across brigades (and even divisions and corps) had no adverse affect on the men, morale or otherwise. I have asked several times on a few forums but have yet to see any source documents that show 'mixing' within brigades had any significant effect, let alone to the degree that their morale plumments by 16.67% in a twenty or thirty minute period.
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