http://www.brettschulte.net/ACWBooks/Valley1864.htm
Struggle for the Shenandoah: Essays on the 1864 Valley Campaign. Edited by Gary Gallagher. The Kent State University Press (1991). 137 pp. 5 maps.
The following is a review and summary of Struggle for the Shenandoah: Essays on the 1864 Valley Campaign, edited by Gary Gallagher. Contributors to this collection of essays include Dennis E. Frye, Gary W. Gallagher, A. Wilson Greene, Robert K. Krick, and Jeffry D. Wert. I’m familiar with all of these authors, and I’ve read books by all except Dennis Frye. Several have written books on the 1864 Valley Campaign, so they are all well qualified to author essays on the subject. This book is the first in a series of essay collections edited by Gallagher. In later titles, some essays wander into Social History, and I’m not too fond of that. However, I was pleasantly surprised here when I found that all five essays focused on the military aspects of the campaign. The maps were only okay. It helps to have Jeffry Wert’s From Winchester to Cedar Creek on hand when reading this title for the maps. Topics include an overview of the campaign, separate essays on Union and Confederate leadership, Early and the Confederate Valley Cavalry, and John S. Mosby’s quest to hinder Sheridan’s campaign. The book is rather short at 137 pages, but the excellent quality of each makes this one worth owning.
"Introduction"
by Gary W. Gallagher
Gallagher discusses the importance of this campaign and also mentions the natural comparisons between the 1862 and 1864 Valley Campaigns. Gallagher says that even though the 1862 Valley Campaign will always be more popular, the 1864 Campaign was much larger and much more important to the outcome of the war. Early was blamed for his defeat in the Valley, but with the 3:1 troop ratio did he really have a chance? Likewise, Sheridan is praised, but when the campaign started, many including Lincoln had serious reservations. The essays in the book were originally part of a 1989 conference held at the Mont Alto campus of Penn State University.
"The Shenandoah Valley in 1864"
by Gary W. Gallagher
This was Gallagher’s standard overview of the Campaign to set the stage for the articles to come. For those of you familiar with this series, Dr. Gallagher usually kicks off these books with this sort of overview essay. In it, he discusses the importance of the Valley to the Confederates due to its use as a launching pad for invasions of the north and its importance as a granary for the South’s armies. The entire extended campaign from New Market to Cedar Creek is detailed. Gallagher’s key points are that this lesser-known Valley Campaign was much more important, that Early could probably not have matched Jackson’s success of 1862 at this later date due to the changed circumstances confronting Early (more Union troops combined in one Army under a competent leader), and that Jackson himself probably could not have stopped Sheridan in 1864. Gallagher concludes by calling the 1864 Valley Campaign "one of the most fascinating and important episodes in Civil War history".
"Jubal A. Early and Confederate Leadership"
by Jeffry D. Wert
Jeffry Wert was well qualified to write this essay. His book From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864 is a model campaign study. In less than one month, Wert writes, Early lost four major battles (Third Winchester, Fisher’s Hill, Tom’s Brook, and Cedar Creek) and more importantly the Shenandoah Valley and its use to the Confederacy as a granary. He believes the Confederacy needed a flawless performance in 1864 in the Valley and Early came up far short. Early’s raid on Washington and burning of Chambersburg, PA raised the stakes and meant the Union would now concentrate a large force against him. Wert covers Early’s character traits and flaws near the beginning of the essay. Early was difficult to work with, saw others’ mistakes and commented loudly, and at the same time ignored or downplayed his own mistakes. Despite having a group of excellent subordinates in Breckenridge, Rodes, Gordon, and Ramseur, these flaws caused Early not to make use of them. Wert indicates that Early was possibly jealous of these other officers, especially John Gordon. Early lacked physical stamina and charisma, but he was at the front of many fights and his courage could not be questioned. Early’s troops respected and had affection for him. One of Early’s biggest flaws, as a long time infantryman, was his distrust and near hatred of his cavalry. To be fair, the Valley Cavalry was pretty poor fighting force, but Early did not use them properly. Wert goes on to detail Early’s mistakes at the major battles of the campaign. In the end, Wert says, "Early and the Army ultimately failed and that Early "was a flawed man and general". Early was ever afterward compared to Jackson and his 1862 success, but Wert believes Early did about as well as could be expected given the long numerical odds and his own peculiar flaws.
"Union Generalship in the 1864 Valley Campaign"
by A. Wilson Greene
Greene is another author I am familiar with. He runs Pamplin Park near Petersburg, VA and has written a solid work on the Union Breakthrough at Petersburg on April 2, 1865. In this assessment of the Union leaders, Greene also covers Sheridan’s four main subordinates in George Crook (Sheridan’s friend at the time and commander of the VIII Corps), Horatio Wright (commander the VI Corps, Greene calls him "competent" but notes that he had "rarely distinguished himself"), William H. Emory (led XIX Corps and provided them with "steady leadership at the Corps level"), and A.T.A. Torbert (commander the Union cavalry, Greene doesn't think much of Torbert, but says he had skilled subordinates). Sheridan’s rather odd appearance is given some attention, and Greene mentions the initial uncertainty with which the Union leadership other than Grant greeted Little Phil. Greene goes on to chronicle the mistakes and successes of Sheridan and his subordinates. Crook performed well and was directly responsible for the smashing success at Fisher’s Hill. In later years, Crook and Sheridan had a falling out over who deserved credit for some of the successes in the Valley. Wright performed generally well, and although he was responsible for the surprise at Cedar Creek, Greene asserts that Wright had gained control of an initially bad situation and saved the army before Sheridan ever arrived. What Sheridan DID do is launch the attack that drove Early from the field. Sheridan’s Campaign won him promotion and personal glory, but more importantly it raised sagging northern morale and helped get Lincoln reelected in the fall. Greene says that during the campaign Sheridan cared little for personal glory but that later in life he made many exaggerated or false claims that earned him the enmity of George Crook among others. The victory started at the top, when Lincoln and Grant backed Sheridan fully and allowed him to fight the Campaign with no outside interference. Still, Greene says, "this campaign belongs to Sheridan more than any other Northern figure". Greene concludes by saying that each one of Sheridan’s victories contained flaws and that critics of the General will always point to his large numerical superiority to explain the results. He believes the victory was not inevitable, but full support from the Union leadership combined with that large numerical superiority made it likely.
“’The Cause of All My Disasters’: Jubal A. Early and the Undisciplined Valley Cavalryâ€