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Bill, I think that the psychological piece was key. When so many of the senior generals felt the war was un-winnable militarily and that the Coalition was not going to be broken, their will to fight was broken by the capture of Paris. I think the question you are raising is why, and how is this different from Berlin, Vienna and Moscow?
A few thoughts: (1) I think your statement about Russian general's fearing for their heads is incorrect. They had a major stake in the system and were afraid to lose privileges in the French won. It was the same with all of the elites in the old regimes, but perhaps more so in Russia. But you are correct, that Moscow was not the main administrative capitol at the time and that lessened the blow. Considering the high "turn-over" of Russian Monarchs in the preceding 60 years, Alexander had at least as much to fear from his generals as they did from him. It turns out that the same was true for Napoleon, although when his Generals turned on him he did not lose his head...
(2) Michael Leggiere, in The Fall of Napoleon Volume 1., goes into much detail on the coalition politics, as well as the morale (including excerpts from their letters) of the Marshalls. Although this volume stops before the main fighting begins, it seems to me that his point is leading to the idea that after the major fighting in 1814, the coalition was not broken by its varying political interests (Prussia and Russia wanting to limit French power, Austria and Britain wanting a stronger, Bourbon France), despite setbacks on the battlefield. He spends a lot of time looking at the political component of the Coalition and what their war aims were.
The fall of Paris, while offering another opening to split the Coalition, which is certainly what Napoleon was hoping to seize upon, was too much for the Marshalls. They were unwilling to try one more throw of the dice (militarily and politically. It has been much written that they wanted to keep their personal gains but also I think their patriotism was a factor too. From what I have read, the French people were starting to turn as well...
Also, the psychological blow was compounded by 9 years of nearly un-interrupted warfare. All of the other major powers (except Britain, whose soil was never violated) had some time off at some point. I think this played a factor in reaching the breaking point for the French.
(3). Leggiere contends that the French were much more reliant on a centralized administration than their opponents. They had a much more "modern" administration and bureaucracy that could not easily handle dislocation.
So basically, I think that the question "why did the fall of Paris lead to the end of French resistance" can be answered by the question of morale. A combination of military events, internal politics, and the self interest and patriotism of the Marshall's led to the Fall of Paris (and the preceding defeat of Napoleon's main field army at, I believe Arcis) being the breaking point of the morale of the Generals. Events are often greater than the sum of their parts (think the Tet offensive, Pearl Harbor, Fall of Atlanta in 1864) and that the interplay of politics, military events, and morale is complicated....
sorry, that wandered a bit. The hazards of posting at work.
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