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<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by john sheffield</i>
I wholehartedly agree Scott. The didaster, for that's what it ultimately was, was down to Bonaparte and his assumption that by starting off towards a vast country like Russia in June he would be able to locate the various armies, bring them to battle AND defeat them before winter set in.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">
Napoleon made the mistake of allowing himself to be diplomatically manoeuvred by Alexander into a position that made invasion inevitable. He found himself backed into a corner from which he had to invade or cede Poland and possibly Prussia to Russia. Invasion was therefore his only course of action, (would we expect anything less from a career military man?).
The principal Russian armies were well within his reach. From the diplomatic posturing that had been coming out of Russia, Napoleon had no reason to suspect that they would not give battle. That they withdrew from day one, applying a scorched earth policy as they went, (up to and including Moscow), was hardly to be expected. On the rare occasions that the Russians offered resistance, they were routinely defeated, Krasnoi, Polotzk, Smolensk, Valoutina-Gora, Shevradino and Borodino.
While people refer to the loss of half a million Frenchmen during the campaign of 1812; it is less often mentioned that Russia lost a comparable number throughout the campaign.
<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">I mean.....what debacle.....WINTER in Russia. Surely even just one brain cell fighting against overblown self importance and imaginary invincibility should have got the message through that catastrophe loomed.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">
IIRC the temperature plummeted earlier than usual in 1812, with January temperatures being attained in late November / early December. Not the biggest factor in the army's losses by any stretch of the imagination, disease, desertion and casualties (dead, wounded and captured), all doubtless contributed more. However, it was the temperature that finished the French army off.
Could this have been predicted? Possibly. Just as they might have predicted that the harvest to the East of the Niemen would be two weeks late that year, or that they would cross the river into a violent hailstorm and several days of torrential rain. All of which took their toll.
It's a funny old thing weather, 200 years later and I suspect that we are not significantly better at predicting it than they were then.[:(]
<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">His army was also so far spread out from front to rear that a huge portion of the troops at the rear were to die of hunger with numerous elements [20% to 30% of the original total] deserting to search for food before ever reaching any forward supply that there may have been.[<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">
Extended lines and a hungry rear echelon were an inevitable consequence of pursuing a foe that had elected to destroy its property as it retreated. That these men were not supplied from the west was not something Napoleon at the front could resolve. Local commanders could and should have taken responsibility for addressing this.
<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"> It's all a bit simplistic to put the blame on " THE WEATHER " as if the possibility of bad weather was something that Bonaparte could not have foreseen and that it just happened to spoil a nice jaunt into Russia.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">
This is true. Far more men were lost on the way to Moscow than on the way home. In fact cold may not have been the most significant contribution to losses during the retreat. However, it was the cold that finished off the remnants of the army. Had this not happened, would Napoleon have remained longer with the army, taken winter quarters with them, I doubt it. Even if he had brought an army of 100,000 back to Poland, he needed to raise an army for 1813. This could only be done from France.
Napoleon's biggest error of the campaign was to think that taking Moscow would cause the Russians to seek terms. There was no reason to believe this would happen, especially since taking of Vienna in prior campaigns had no such effect on the Austrians.
And, of course, if Napoleon had remained with his army and perished in Russia or Poland, in Britain we would be short of a national hero and a name for a railway station - so a little more gratitude if you please[:D][:D][;)]
Mark
VII Corps
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