Shannon and I at
www.shoelessbivouac.net/acwhrules.html are now
currently engaged in the following:
<b>Scenario 103</b>
First Manassas (Historical)
w/Sectional Artillery, "Fixed" set-up, Weather.
--We have ultimately concluded to remove <i>all</i> Union Division Leaders from play to improve historical accuracy and play balance.
(Please, scroll down to review Col. Heintzelman's supremely revealing <i>Official Report</i>.)<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">
"There are NO division-level actions in 1st Manassas. The largest unit that can perform an action is a brigade. -- <i>First Blood, The First Battle of Manassas</i> ©1989 --Richard Berg
"None of the leaders at 1st Manassas had experience commanding large bodies of troops; most of them were used to leading regiments or
companies. Consequently, many brigades were committed piecemeal; i.e., one regiment at a time. This proved to be a disaster, and was probably the one single telling point in the Union failure. -- <i>First Blood, The First Battle of Manassas</i> ©1989 --Richard Berg
"McDowell had clearly studied his Frederick the Great, but he failed to notice that Frederick's grand flank attacks had usually relied upon an exceptionally well drilled and experienced army. At First Manassas there was no such army available, <i>so the attacks went in piecemeal and ineffectively.</i> Because the Union manoeuvres were more complex and demanding than the Confederate response, they fell apart more quickly ...." -- <i>Battle Tactics of the Civil War</i>, Paddy Griffith, pp 31-32.<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">Ineffective ... piecemeal ... regiments or companies.
Below is Colonel Heintzelman's Official Report - a revealing demonstration of his observably limited determination and abilities to command - a Division, or lack thereof. And, in his own candid words, no less.
It is believed that Heintzelman's account remains only part of a greater whole of the long anticipated "Volume I," entitled, <i>Leadership Command & Control Issues at First Manassas</i>© 1861.
One near-sighted aide to Beauregard believes he last saw the woefully mis-underestimated if critically brilliant Vol. I thoughtlessly wrapped between two discarded cigar wrappers left in the vicinity of an unidentifiable ford.
In any case, by reviewing the following report, one can begin to appreciate why there are NO Division actions at 1st Manassas. <blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote">"General McDowell, who, accompanied by his staff, had passed us a short time before, sent back Captain Wright, of the Engineers, and Major McDowell, one of his aides, with orders to send forward <u>two regiments</u> to prevent the enemy from outflanking them.
"Captain Wright led forward the <u>Minnesota regiment</u> ...In the mean time I sent orders for the <u>zouaves</u> to move forward, to support Ricketts' battery on its right. As soon as they came up <u>I
led them</u> forward against an Alabama regiment, partly concealed in a clump of small pines in an old field. At the first fire they broke, and the greater portion fled to the rear, keeping up a desultory firing over the heads of their comrades in front.
"I then led up the <u>Minnesota regiment</u>, which was also repulsed, but retired in tolerably good order.
"Next was led forward the <u>First Michigan</u>, which was also repulsed, and retired in considerable confusion. They were rallied, and helped to hold the woods on our right.
"The <u>Brooklyn Fourteenth</u> then appeared on the ground, coming forward in gallant style. I led them forward to the left, where the Alabama regiment had been posted in the early part of the action, now disappeared. We soon came in sight of the line of the enemy, drawn up beyond the clump of trees. Soon after the firing commenced the regiment broke and ran. I considered it useless to attempt to rally them.
"The want of discipline in <i>these regiments</i> was so great, that most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards to the rear and continue to fire---fortunately for the braver ones, very high in the air--repelling those in front to retreat." --Colonel P. Samuel Heintzelman's Official Report For the Battle of First Mnassas. --http://thomaslegion.net/colonelsamuelpheintzelmansofficialreportforthebattleoffirstmanassas.html<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"></blockquote id="quote"></font id="quote">Q) Common theme?
Q) Is Heintzelman's self-described conduct that of an expected Division Level Commander?
Q) Where were Heintzelman's <i>brigade</i> officers on July 21, 1861, presumably, still under Tiller's - if not poor Colonel Heintzelman's - Division Level Command Bonus spell!?
So,
--Colonel Heintzelman describes leading single regiments into battle - just what one would expect of a colonel / regimentally trained officer.
--He both thought and acted as a regimental colonel . . . commanding one regiment, then another, and another - so he claims - while rather candidly admitting to being repulsed, time and again, with eventual total loss of command and control over all <i>his regiments</i>.
Stunning, but predicted, given the documented if dismal performance of Union command on that day.
<u>To Review</u>:
Richard Berg, Paddy Griffith, an egregiously overwhelmed if seriously inexperienced colonel (Heintzelman), and now we, too, have no other recourse but to recommend a summary dismissal of <i>all</i> Division Leaders from further consideration at First Manassas.
Fld. Lt. D. Shoeless, CSA
Secretary of the Cabinet (Ret)
1st Tenn Provisional Army
<center><i>From a certain point onward there is no turning back. That is the point that must be reached.</i> --F. Kafka</center>