<blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by KWhitehead</i>
<br /><blockquote id="quote"><font size="3" face="book antiqua" id="quote">quote:<hr height="1" noshade id="quote"><i>Originally posted by Phil Driscoll</i>
But what is a fact is that the man who had a need to preserve his 'smaller' army, on more than one occasion '<i>substituted brute force for tactics</i>' and threw his troops into frontal assaults relying on his superior troops to win the day. Malvern Hill, Picket's Charge-shall we go on.[}:)]
As for the conjecture of swapping Lee and Grant it is hard to predict what would have happened. At the time Grant took command the AOP was a battleax-capable of doing a lot of damage but hard to wield. Ponderous, slow to move and react-incapable of traveling light or reacting quickly-in otherwords McClellan trained.[:I] It is hard to see Lee wielding it like he did the ANV. [:)]JMHO
Brig. Gen. Phil Driscoll
1st Brigade/1st Division/VCorps/AoP
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The idea that if the South had fought more of a Joe Johnston type war, conserving its strength for the long haul, is an error. One that Lee saw. He did not think the South could survive a protracted war. The South didn't lose because of lack of manpower but the inability to feed what they had. Lee's view was that the South needed a decisive victory and he entered every battle with that intention. Unfortunately for him, he didn't have the resources to deliver it but he still tried leading to things like Pickett's charge. But saying he was a bad general due to that one overriding mistake to to ignore how often he succeeded. Malvern Hill wasn't an attack he wanted to make as it was made. It was caused by a series of command failures by subordinates. While at Gaines Mill a similiar attack against the Union center broke Porter's Corps.
As a commander in the Seven Days he had more than 100,000 troops under his direction. And, in spite of being still out numbered and poorly lead he cam close to destroying the Union army. Saying his tactics caused heavy casualties is true but if he had succeeded no one would be mentioning that now.
But for comparing generals all we can look at is what they had to work with and how successful they were with it. Lee took a small army with a lot of very eccentric commanders and defended a theater in which he was out numbered by two sometimes three to one for the duration of the war. Grant commanded an army or armies two to three times the size of his opponents with superiority in mobility both due to railroads and river/sea and had to win by starving the enemy out. Grant when stymied like at Vicksburg could show some tactical creativity but he didn't often.
LG. Kennon Whitehead
Chatham Grays
1/1/III AoM (CSA)
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First, my hat's off to General Whitehead for apparently being the only Confederate officer to stand up and defend General Lee. I can remember the day when I would have said that and the chairs and whiskey bottles would have been flying. Now most of this thread is taken up by Union officers debating which Union General was the best. What a sad state of affairs our foe has reached. [:(]
Now to dispute General Whitehead's arguments. The first thing that struck me as odd was his claim about how outnumbererd Lee was and what a numerical superiority that Grant had in their battles. I did a quick search, of Wikipedia I must admit but I think the numbers should be fairly close, of the number of troops involved in each General's battles. Here is what I found with the attackers ratio to defenders listed.
Peninsula: ANV=90,000 AoP=105,000 .86 to 1
2nd Bull Run: ANV=55,000 AoP=77,000 .72 to 1
Antietam: ANV=45,000 AoP=87,000 1.94 to 1
Fredericksburg: ANV=72,000 AoP=87,00 1.21 to 1
Gettysburg: ANV=72,000 AoP=94,000 .77 to 1
Wilderness: ANV=61,000 AoP=102,000 1.68 to 1
Spotsylvania: ANV=52,000 AOP=100,000 1.93 to 1
Cold Harbor: ANV=62,000 AoP=108,000 1.75 to 1
Fort Donelson: CSA=16,000 USA=25,000 1.57 to 1
Shiloh: CSA=45,000 USA=49,000 .92 to 1
Vicksburg: CSA=36,000 USA=72,000 2 to 1
Chattanooga: CSA=44,000 USA=56,000 1.28 to 1
Once again these numbers may not be exact but they should provide a close enough approximation to see tha only one time did Grant achieve a 2 to 1 superiority and never a 3 to 1. Conversely Lee was never outnumbered 2 or 3 to 1. Now consider that in several of Lee's victories he was attacked while occupying prepared defenses (Cold Harbor, Antietam, Fredricksburg) where conventional wisdom dictates that the attacker have a 3 to 1 advantage, which they didn't achieve. You could also argue that neither one faced the first team of the other until the Overland Campaign of 1864. Once again the Union is on the attack in this campaign without that 3 to 1 advantage. Lee and Grant fought that campaign to amounted to a series of bloody draws until Grant outmaneuvered Lee which led to the siege of Petersburg. This is where the crumbling economy and transportation system of the Confederacy let Lee down and the Union superiority in logistics and finally numbers began to tell. If you look at Lee's campaigns he only once made an attack that was a clear victory, but not decisive (2nd Bull Run) and even that did not decide the campaign. Grant meanwhile, managed to force the surrender of two Confederate Armies and shatter a third. If you examine the Vicksburg campaign, which has to be recognized as one of the most brilliant campaigns of the war, Grant won through maneuver, not decisive numbers. The CSA is operating on interior lines while Grant has to cut his supply line to operate in hostile territory with CSA forces on both sides of him. The fact that he forced Pemberton's hand and really gave him little choice but to defend Vicksburg, even if he had wanted to abandon it, was outstanding. I think if you put Grant in McClellan's shoes on several occasions the war is over much sooner...or at the very least Richmond falls much sooner.
General Mark Nelms
6/3/IX/AoO
"Blackhawk Brigade"
Union Military Academy Instructor
Union Cabinet Secretary
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