Napoleonic Wargame Club (NWC)

Salute!

August 23rd, the Armee of Bohemia has arrived before the outskirts of Dresden, and Marechal St. Cyr, tasked with the defense of this vital center of operations has sent word to L'Empereur of the need for reinforcement.

At his battle headquarters, Napoleon and his staff closely pondered the campaign maps laid out before them and conclude that a golden opportunity is presenting itself. With almost all his forces drawn up to the south of Dresen, Schwarzenberg is exposing his communications to a sudden blow through Konigstein and Pirna.

The commands went out and immediately fantassins from near and far marched to the concentration point at Stolpen, ready to launch another brilliant manoeuver sur les derrieres.

It is my opinion that during these climactic days (22nd - 30th August) that Napoleon had his best opportunity to win a decisive battle, but a last minute decision to weaken the planned maneuver in order to shore up the defense of Dresden was fatal.

I'd be pleased to hear the thoughts and impressions of others on this critical phase of the Fall Campaign, 1813.

Regards,

Salute!

August 25th, 1813, is the fateful day of the Campaign, to my PoV.

Napoleon had already issued the orders directing the various Corps' to concentrate for the impending maneuver into the Armee of Bohemia's rear (planning to use Dresden as a pinning force).

However, on this very morning hazy reports reached L'Empereur's battle headquarters of Marechal Oudinot's misadventures far to the north near Berlin.

News of Grossbeeren heralded the potential Allied threat to Napoleon's recently reconstructed lines of communication established for the purpose of the maneuver in the south.

This complication compelled Napoleon to shift part of Dresden's garrison to safeguard the LoC, thus weakening the force available to Marechal St Cyr for the defense of the city.

To determine the exact situation there, Napoleon sent his aide de camp Gourgaud to the city.
Gourgaud returned and the news he brought may well have been the drop of water in the bucket that turned the wheel of fate this day.
The AdC informed Napoleon that should the Allies attack St Cyr would be unable to hold them back.

And so Napoleon changed the dispostition of his maneuver - directing the Guard, Latour-Maubourg, Victor and Marmont all to the city, leaving only Vandamme to conduct the maneuver.

The rest is history: a tactical victory against superior odds at Dresden, but a defeat of resounding effect for Vandamme at Kulm.

What would have occured differently had Napoleon left just one or two more Corps with Vandamme for the initial advance upon the Allied rear?

Or for the matter, if the pursuit from Dresden after the retreating Allies had been better organized?

Yet the difficult terrain of the Bohemian mountains must be given their due here as well.
All the forces involved in the actions leading up to the battle of Kulm had to struggle upon the same marginal mountain paths, in bad weather, and separated from each other.

Regards,

Salute!

August 26th, 1813

I would like to share the following passage from Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon, as it is one of my favorites.

... as the Allies mustered their 150,000 troops in preparation for the great assault... the Allied leaders, however, watching the changing scene from the Racknitz Heights, were far from happy or unanimous.

From 09:00 hrs onward they had noticed a stir running through Dresen, and eventually the dreaded cry, "Vive l'Empereur" reached their ears in the occasional lulls in the artillery bombardment.

Napoleon had arrived!

The Tsar felt that the action should be broken off at once, in compliance with the agreed policy of avoiding fighting Napoleon in person.

The Empereor of Austria refused to disclose his mind, but the King of Prussia, the one-time ninny of 1806, was extemely outspoken in favor of fighting Napoleon there and then on such favorable numerical terms.

While the matter was being thrashed out, Schwarzenberg was instructed to postpone the main attack. But the passage of orders down the chain of command was slow, and before the new decision could be transmitted the three-gun signal for the opening of the assault had been fired and the masses of the Allied army set themselves in motion, while their aghast commanders in chief stared disbelievingly through their telescopes and swore roundly.

Regards,

General Schmidgall, a stirring passage indeed. I have read it many times myself, but there is one question that still burns in my mind. If you would be so kind as to jog my memory, I would politely inquire as to who won the war?

France! LGA is never defeated!

Or more accurately, it is a long running draw betwixt LGA and the evil coalition. Our little virtual war just keeps going on and on, and no matter how many times we hear tales of victory here in the Rhine, the enemy keeps surviving to fight another day.

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Marechal Jeff Bardon
Duc de Castiglione et Prince de Wagram
Commandant de la Garde Imperiale

Today, 200 years ago, the real fun, though short lived, began!!

To Arms!!!!!

See the Prussians are always the ONLY ones who want to fight..... It is no wonder we won the War!

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Generalfeldmarschall Scott Kronprinz "Vorwärts" Ludwig von Preußen
Kommandeur des Königlich-Preußischen Armee-Korps
Chief of Staff (CoS) of the Allied Coalition
Allied Coalition Webmaster & Club Website Support

It has been a while since I read up on this portion of the campaign, but I do seem to remember that the pursuit after Dresden was slow to develop, leaving Vandamme to dangle....Not sure if the French were in any shape to pursue but they were certainly slow...A well organized, timely pursuit could have changed the strategic matrix...

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Salute!

The pursuit post Dresden has long been criticized as being poorly directed, and very slow.

I think there were many factors at work here: first of all the fact that in order to reach Dresden in the first place most of the Grande Armee had endured a forced march of some 120 miles.

Secondly, there is the great battle itself, which no doubt had wrought much more fatigue upon the fantassins.

Even so, off into the mountains they went in pursuit of a retreating enemy whose direction they did not know (a paltry cavalry force is at work here again as at Lutzen and Bautzen).

Thirdly, the weather, which was particularly nasty.

The Battle of Kulm was fought to a Draw until the second day, when it was the Allies who gained the advantage of a battle korps marching inadvertantly into the rear of Vandamme's position, while seeking to escape a pursuer of their own.

It is hardly ever advisable to pursue a foe, even one retreating after losing a battle, into hostile mountain terrain, in foul weather, along rough paths and tracks.

Such an operation during this era of physcial communication only was not likely to succeed.

Regards,

Indeed, I too have wondered if fatigue and weather were a factor in the poor pursuit. The 2nd Day at Dresden was fought in terrible conditions that must have been exhausting....But your point on communication also provides some excuse for Napoleon abandoning his original plan. In all, I agree with you that this was a lost opportunity for Napoleon both before and after the battle, but the allies could have acted with more vigor as well, although their Austrian troops were very raw..

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